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Summer List 3, Sheet 2 
Cert to CA 10 
No. 77-1646 (Seth, McWilliams, Barrett) 
JONES (accident victim) 
v. 
FARMERS ALLIANCE (insurance co.) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges under Erie the decision of 
the DC to permit resp to bring a declaratory judgment diversity 
action, the failure of the DC to realign the nominal parties so as 
to destroy diversity, and the ultimate decision to grant summary 
judgment. There is nothing certworthy here. 
2. FACTS: In 1975, respondent issued a general automobile 
insurance liability policy to the Spann Chevrolet Company providing 
- 2 -
that respondent would insure against any liability arising from 
automobile accidents in which the named insured, any officer of 
the corporation or anyone using a car owned by Spann Chevrolet 
with permission were involved. In May 1976, a Camaro driven by 
one Shippey, but owned by Spann Chevrolet was involved in an 
accident. Shippey was killed, Melissa Spann, and two other 
passengers were injured. Melissa Spann had been given permission 
to use the vehicle, but apparently Shippey had not. 
Subsequently, two of the passengers filed negligence in 
state court naming Spann's estate as the defendant. Prior to the 
litigation of these actions, responaent filed a declaratory 
judgment action in federal court naming Spann Chevrolet, Orval 
Spann, Melissa Spann, Spann's estate and the other two passengers 
as defendants. (Respondent is a Kansas Corp. while all the 
defendants reside in Oklahoma.) The DC granted summary judgment 
for respondent on the ground that no permission to operate the 
vehicle had been given to Shippey and thus respondent would/could 
not be liable under the insurance policy with Spann Chevrolet. 
The two passengers appealed the decision alleging that the 
DC had no jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, that 
Orval Spann and Spann Chevrolet should have been realigned as 
parties, and that summary judgment should not have been granted. 
The CA affirmed. It first rejected the claim that since under 
Oklahoma law an insurance company cannot bring a declaratory 
judgment action, under Erie it should not be allowed to bring such 
an action in DC. The CA held that the Declaratory Judgment Act 
- 3 -
involves only procedural remedies not substantive rights, and 
thus under Erie it is not necessary to look to state law. Generally, 
theCA found the DC's decision to allow declaratory relief to 
be well within its discretion. The CA also rejected the argument 
that the parties should have been realigned so as to destroy 
diversity. Specifically, the CA looked to the pleadings and 
determined that there did exist a dispute between Spann Chevrolet 
and the respondent, in that Spann claimed that the insurance 
company had an obligation to defend it in any negligence suit 
that should arise out of the accident. Finally, the CA agreed 
that the granting of summary judgment was appropriate. No evidence 
was presented in the DC -- via affidavits or otherwise -- suggesting 
any basis for infering that Shippey had even the implied permission 
of Spann Chevrolet to drive the disputed vehicle. 
DISCUSSION: I doubt that this fact-specific diversity case 
warrants any attention here. . The decision of the CA seems 
largely correct. I would deny. There is a response. 
6/21/78 
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Summer List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 77-1645 
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE 
ADVISORS, INC., ET AL. 
v. 
LEWIS 
Cert to CA 9 (East, SDJ, 
Browning; Walla0e; dissents) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
I. SU~WARY: The question presented is whether a private right 
of action may be implied under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 
This is the same issue as was raised in Fleschner v. Abrahamson, 
No. 77-1279, cert. ~(!-iay 15, 1978). 
II. FACTS: Resps sued petrs (four corporate or trust entities 
and five individual trustees of a mortage trust) in DC, asserting a 
private right of action under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 
J... :.J ~ 
~ ·d In a terse order, the DC 
r ..... ~~ I))M 
dismissed the complaint, holding that the 
"" ~~~- · 1 ~ moft. devt I opme,f J t/,d 
.naiAVn 11 1'fl.. I 
-2-
Act provided no basis for such an action. 
III. HOLDING BELOW: Writing for ,. himself and Judge Browning, 
Senior District Judge East (of Charlestone Stone fame) reversed, 
holding that a private right of action could be implied under the Act. 
~The opinion contains no analysis; it merely cites with approval 
the decisions of CA 2 and CA 5 in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 
568 F.2d 862 (CA 2 1977), and Wilson v. First Houston Investme nt 
Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (CA 5 1978). 
Judge Wallace dissented in an opinion which also contained 
no analysis; he cited with approval o~-~d~ Gurf~ 
in Abrahamson, supra, and nothin~ more. 
IV. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend that there is no private right 
of action under the Act. Their analysis is succinct: ''Rather 
than repeat the reasons why a writ should issue here, we respectful ly 
refer the Court to the petition for certiorari filed in Abrahamson, 
and specifically to pages 7-15." 
Resp notes that certiorari was denied in Abrahamson on May 15, 
1978. 
V. DISCUSSION: For a discussion of the issues underlying 
petrs' claim, see the pool memo for Abrahamson. Since the Court 
was not interested in considering that one, I would not think that 
cert should be granted here. 
There is a response. 
6-14-78 Jay Op in petn 
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Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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.Jupuntt <!}llltrl cf tlrt 'Jtnift~ :.itzdtg 
~MJri:nghttt. ~. <!}. 2ll~'!~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
October 26, 1978 
Re: Nos. 77-1645 and 77-1717, Transamerica 
Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis; and 
First Houston Invetment Corp. v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis, 
Please add my name to your dissenting 
opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u:prtmt Q}tturl ttf tift ~t~ ~tatts 
jj'uftittgLm. ~. <!}. 2llP:'1~ 
October 12, 1978 
Re: Nos. 77-1645 and 77-1717 Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis; and First Houston 
Investment Corp. v. Wilson 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Sincerely,,_/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
'• 
1st DRAJ!T t 2 0 l1 
SUPREME COURT 'OF ',fHE UNITED STATES 
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. 
(TAMA) .ET AL. v. HARRY LEWIS 
ON PETITION fOU WRIT Of CJ!:R'l'IORARI TO THE UNITED S'I'ATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THI<J NINTH CIRCUIT 
FIRST HOUSTON INVESTMENT CORP. ET AL. v. 
JOHN M. WILSON 
QN PETI'l'ION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAlU TO TfiE UNITED STATES 
CQU:fl.T OF APPEALS FO!;t TlfE fiFTH CIRCUI'r 
Nos. 77-1645 m1d 77-ln7. Decided October-, 1978 
MR. JusTICE Po'fELL, dissenting. 
These cases present the question whether § 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Act), 15 U.S. C.§ 80b-6, 
giv;' ";) uSt'om~serring fraud a private cause of action 
against a.n investment company f!Ud its aqviser. As it did last 
Term in fi'leschner v. Abraharnsor1,- U. S. -, 46 U. S. L. W. 
3710 (May 15, 1978) , the Court today declines an opportunity 
to decide this quest~on. The Act contains no provision author-
izing private suits. · and whether authority to sue may be 
inferred has caused sharp disagreement withi11 the courts of 
appeals. · 
The respondellt in No. 77-1645 is a sha.r~hqlder of the 
Mortgage Trust of Americlt ( MT A) , a re~tl estate invest-
ment tru('lt under l. R. C. §~ 856-858. He brought suit 
against MTA aqd various companies and individuals associ-
ated with MTA (the petitioners), alleging that t~e petitioners 
had participated in a fraud~lent scheme under which ·MTA 
was organized and operated to the advantage of its adviser and 
parent ~tnd to the detriment of MTA's iuvestors. Each qf the 
complaint's six Cll.USes of action purported to be based on § 206 
of the Act, which m~kes it illegal for an mvestment adviser 
covered by the Act to "e!1gage in any transaction, practice; or 
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon 
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any client or prospective client." Jurisdiction was invoked 
under ~ 214 of the ' Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-14, which gives 
federal courts jurisdiction "of violations of this subchapter or 
the rules, regulBrtions, or orders thereunder, and ... of all sqits 
in equity to enjoiq a.ny violation of this sqbchapter .... " 
The District Court for the N ortheru District of California 
dismissed the respondeut's suit. ruling that ~ 206 of the Act 
does not afford investors such ::ts the respondent a private 
cause of action against a.n in~estment company. The Court 
of Appeals for the Kinth Circuit reversed, stating simply that 
it h~d reviewed the question and agreed wit}:l th~ Second and 
Fifth Circuits that § 206 gives rise to a private cause of action. 
See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 86:2 ·( 1977), cert. 
denied, ·- 1J. S. -, 46 U. S. L. W. 3710 (May 15, 1978); 
Wilsou \', First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 
(CA5 1978). cert. dellled this day. No. 77-1717. One judge 
dissented from the court's decision, stating that he also had 
reviewed the question and sided with th~ dissent in 
A braham son. 
The respondent in No. 77- 1717 is an individual who en-
trusted his stock portfolio, worth $104.358. to the m'anagement 
of the petitioners (First Houston Investment Company and 
thre<> of its employees). Within 18 months, First Houston 
had transformed the portfolio through extensive trading into 
a list of stocks worth slightly over $5.000. The respondent 
brought suit against the petitioners asserting, inter alia, that 
they had violated ~ 206 of the Act by 1nisrepresenting First 
Houston 's 'nwthod of operations. 
The District Court for the Western District of Texas 
dismissed the respondent's claim under ~ 206. hut the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. After examining the 
requirements this Court ha,s set down for implying private 
causes of action, see Piper v. Chri.<J-Craft 1 tldustries, Inc., 430' 
U. S. 1 (1 977) . the court concluded that § 206 gives rise to a 
private action for damages. ln so ruling, the court relied 
heavily upon the Second Circuit's opinion in Abrahamson v. 
lj''l'esdmeJ', One rn€mber. oi the panel dissented from the Fifth 
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. v. LEWIS 3 
Circuit 's ruling, arguing that the ·purpose of the Act was to 
allow Congress to gather the information necessa,ry for it to 
decide whether it should legislate further concerniug abuses of 
ipvestment companies. Tl1Us, the dissent concluded that § 206 
was not meant to provtde a private cause of action for individ~ 
ual investors. 
Recent decisions of this Court have re9..ffirmed tha.t private 
causes of actiqn will be il1ferred from securities statutes only 
if such an inference is consistent with the language and history 
of the statute a:qd is necessary to avoid subversion of Congress' 
purpose in passing the statute. See, e. g., Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977). If cpurts are to avo.id 
stepping beyond the legislative bounda.ries set by Congress, 
they must take care in extending damage liability under 
statutes that do not create such liability explicitly. In the 
words of Justice Frankfurter, "[a]t best this is Sl.lbtle business, 
calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere 
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of 
legislation bec~mes legislation itself." Palmer v. M assachu-
setts, 308 U. S. 79, 83 (1!=139). This danger i~S particularly 
act.lte with respect to § 206 of the Act, as Congress has 
declined to proyide for priva.te d!lmage a.ctions, 'although it 
severa.l times hf:ls reviewed and otherwise strengthened the 
enforcement me~hanisrps of the Apt. See the opinion of Judge 
Gurfein, concu'rriug ancl dissenting in Abrahdmson v. Flesch'f!.er, 
568 F. 2d 862, 883-884 (CA2 1977), an opi~ion that I find 
quite persuasive. 
Moreover, tt~e jurisdictio11al grant of the Act differs from 
tha,t of other securities acts in its reference only to "suits in 
equity"; other acts include as well a grant of jurisdiction 
extending to "actions at law brought to enforce any lia.bility 
or duty created [under the A.ct] ." Compare § 214 of the Act 
with § 44 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. 8. C. 
§' 80a-43. · 
Three Courts pf Appeals npw have oonsidered whether § 206 
of the Act creates a private action for da~ages against invest-
ment companies. In each case, the panel has been sha.rply 
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divided in its resolution of the question, individual members 
having drawn different inferences from the l~tnguag'e and legis-
lative history of the Act. furthermore, the liability of invest-
' ment companies to private damage suits under the Act is a 
matter of considerable importance both to the companies and 
to the public Wlth whom they deaL 
I would grant certiorari, 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G 
No. 77-1645 




Justice Powell ~/ To: 
Re: TAMA v. Lewis--No. 77-1645, and First Houston v. Wilson--
No. 77-1717 (~~~~ 
At your request I have reviewed t~t~in~ 
A'./~~  LA-/ ~ 
to determine whether certiorari shoul~~anted 1n both and 
~
the cases heard together, or one should be held for the 
decision in the other. As the question presented here is 
solely one of the proper interpretation of §206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act, the development of the record largely 
in inconsequential for the Court's purposes. Nevertheless, 
there are two factors that the Court should take into account 
in deciding how to review these cases. 
1. The Court of Appeals' opinions in ~irst Houston, No. 
77-1717, are much more discursive and informative than those in 
TAMA, No. 77-1645. As we noted in our dissent to the denial of 
certiorari, in the latter case the Court of Appeals merely 
stated their agreement or disagreement with Abrahamson v. 
Fleschner. 
2. More important, however, in First Houston there is a 
~~- ~~~~ iss~: presented in the certiorari petition that 





plaintiff's original complaint charged violations of both the 
Investment Advisers Act and §10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act. Upon motion of the defendants, the district court 
dismissed both parts of the complaint, but gave the plaintiff 
leave to amend the §10(b) allegations. Plaintiff amended the 
§10(b) charge, but the amended complaint made no mention of the 
Investment Advisers Act. The district court then gave the .------ ----
defendants judgment on the pleadings, and the plaintiff 
appealed. Plaintiff's notice of appeal from this ruling made 
no mention of the original dismissal of the Investment Advisers 
Act claim. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that it had 
jurisdiction to review both claims. In so doing, the court 
admitted that it was going contrary to a ruling of the ninth 
circuit. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). 
Petitioner has presented this ruling of the Court of 
Appeals for review in addition to the Investment Advisers Act 
issue. Unless the Court wants to decide both questions, 
therefore, it should grant certiorari in~' No. 77-1645 
alone, and hold First Houston, No. 77-1717 for the decision in 
TAMA. ---
11/3/78 David 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Relisted for Mr. Justice Powell. 
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Rehnquist, J ........... . 
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lfp/ss 2/J:.,r-/79 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Clerk DATE: Feb. 20, 1979 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
77-1645 TransAmerica Mortage v. Lewis 
This case (cert to CA9), which I urqed the Court 
to grant, presents the following questions: 
"May a private right of action at law for damages 
be implied under §214 of the Investment Advisers 
Act?" 
As I have read the briefs, and am dictating this 
memo in my apartment on the day of the "great snow", I do 
not have my file or access to the books. The purpose of the 
memo will he to identify - briefly and incompletely - the 
arguments of the parties, and the point or points that I 
would like my clerk particularly to address. 
Courts of appeals in CA2 (Abrahamson v. Fleschner) 
and CAS (Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp.) had 
answered this question in the affirmative prior to CA9's 
consideration of this case. CA9 agreed, adopting in effect 
the majority opinions in Fleschner and Wilson. Judge 
Wallace dissented, adopting Judge Gurfein's dissent in 
Fleschner. Several district courts have agreed with the 
courts of appeals. I am not aware of any decision to the 
contrary. 
I voted to grant primarily because of my tentative 
agreement with Judge Gurfein's dissent in Fleschner. 
Although the SEC's amicus brief attacks Gurfein's opinion 
with vigor, and may score some points against it, I continue 
to lean toward the Gurfein view. 
The parties seem to agree that the four-point 
of Cort v. Ash is Not 
differ in its app lication. 
The second Cort factor is whether there "[is] 
indication of legislative intent explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or deny one?" Of the four 
Cort factors this seems to me the most important in this 
case because both the language and 
------
siqnificant and consistent support 
--------~--'-----'---------------------------------the question presented. 
-~ 
S~ction 214 of the Advisers Act confers 
jurisdiction on state and federal courts "of all suits in 
equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the 
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder". It does not 
confer jurisdiction over "actions at law". This distinction 
is siqnificant in view of the fact that the Securities Acts 
of 1933 and 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940 all 
provide that District Courts shall have jurisdiction of "all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by" those acts. The Advisers Act 
and the Investment Company Act were introduced in Congress 
at the same time, and are considered as companion 
legislation. 
SEC's early draft of the Advisers Act 
2. 
incorporated a provision - similar' to that in the Investment 
Company Act conferring jurisdiction over "actions at law". 
But this was omitted from the final draft enacted by 
Congress, although the record is not entirely clear as to 
why this occurred. Petitioner's brief argues that it was 
the result of a compromise between supporters and opponents 
of the legislation. 
See Judge Gurfein's opinion, addressing the 
significance of the difference in language between these 
related securities statutes. 568 F.2d, at 881. 
Petitioner's brief also points out that Congress 
had opportunities to include "actions at law" in 1960, 1970 
and 1978 - when amendments to the Advisers Act either were 
adopteo by Congress or considered by it, and no change was 
made in the original language. Indeed, in 1976, the SEC 
proposed an amendment that would have expressly conferred 
jurisdiction over "actions at law". Although the bill was 
referred out by the Senate Committee, it did not come to a 
vote. 
The 1976 amendments were reintroduced by the SEC 
in January 1977, but no hearings were held on the bill. I 
do not know whether these amendments have again been 
introduced in the new Congress. My clerk should check this. 
Respondents and the SF.C's lengthy amicus brief 
devote major efforts to explain away what seems, certainly 
3. 
·~----------------------------·~--~"·~--------------------~--------------~---L--~ 
upon first consideration, to be rather conclusive evidence 
that Congress had never intended to authorize private 
actions for damages. The SG's brief, apparently written 
Easterbrook, makes the rather novel argument that the 
~---------~ - ----~ 
legislative history - including the language of the Act -
neutral. Brief 20, 24. He argues, therefore, there is no 
indication that Congress intended to foreclose private 
remedies. This view iqnores the various indications to 
contrary mentioned above. Moreover, if in fact both the 
lanquaqe and legislative history were strictly neutral, who 
would have the burden of showing a private right of action. 
Would not one who a.sserts the right have it? 
The strongest point made by respondent and the 
is that in Blue Chip Stamps we approved the longstanding 
view of the lower federal courts that a private cause of 
action may be implied from §10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The 
opinion in Blue Chip Stamps noted that "this Court had no 
occasion to deal with the subject until 20-odd years" after 
the seminal Cardon decision had inferred a cause of action 
under these provisions, and that in two cases decided in 
1971 and 1972, respectively, "we confirmed with virtually 
discussion the overwhelming consensus of the district 
and courts of appeals that such a cause of action did 
exist". This inference was sustained despite the fact that 
other provisions of the Securities Act did provide expressly 
4. 
for civil remedies. I would welcome any insight from my 
clerk as to the effect of the Court's holding with respect 
to lO(b) and lOb-S on petitioner's basic argument that the 
language and legislative history of the Advisers Act (as 
compared with the other Securities Act statutes) strongly 
support a no private right of action view. At least, it can 
be said - as the opinion in Blue Chip Stamps suggests - that 
after 20-odd years of acceptance by district and courts of 
appeals and without any contrary reaction by Congress, this 
Court accepted established precedent "with virtually no 
discussion". There has been no comparable period of 
acceptance as to §214. 
I do not view the other three factors of Cort v. 
Ash to be more than make weights in this case. Fair 
arguments can be made on both sides as to whether the 
plaintiff (respondent here) is a member of the class "for 
whose especial benefit this statute was enacted". 
I 
Similarly, it is not clear whether an implied civil action 
is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the 
legislative scheme". I do think the fourth factor (whether 
the cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state 
law") does cut in favor of petitioner. Both at common law, 
and by statute in many cases, suits for negligence and 
certainly for fraud can be brought against petitioners in 
this case. Indeed, respondent's complaint contains common 
s. 
law averments. 
I would like my clerk's advice with respect to the 
final argument made by petitioner: that "implying a private 
right of action for damages under the Advisers Act would 
destroy the limitations on private actions by investors" 
established in Blue Chip Stamps (requiring a purchase or 
sale as a prerequisite to suit), and in Ernst & Ernst 
(limiting damage suits to fraud or at least gross 
negligence. Judge Gurfein made this point quite forcefully, 
and - at least on the surface it has substantial appeal. 
The SG's brief makes quite an argument to the contrary, 
I do not fully understand. 
In sum, and based on a snowbound three hours 
the briefs, I continue to lean to the Gurfein and Wallace 
view. Moreover, increasingly I have come to think that the 
Court has gone much too far in inferring federal private 
causes of action where Congress has chosen to remain silent. 
Principles of federalism, where state courts traditionally 
have exercised jurisdiction over a particular type claim, 
should require that Congress confront openly the question 
whether there are sound reasons for also authorizing federal 
court suits. One even can suspect that the draftsmen and 
sponsors of legislation, taking note of what can be 
described as the eagerness of federal courts to enhance 
their own jurisdiction, deliberately avoid legislative 
6. 
hearings and controversy simply by drafting statutes in what 
Easterbook calls a "neutral" fashion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
• 
March 31, 1979 
Re: 77-1645 - Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. 
v. Lewis 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I conclude to reverse in this case. 
I will also be willing to vote for 
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t of action be 
~~~~ 2. PARTIES CONTENTIONS. 
A. Petitioner. 
only the question whether a private right of action for damages 
{p )11 may be maintained under the Act. Ini tally, l?etr pressed the 
'\IIJLJ ~ a¥"' (T ~ ument, made forcefully by Judge Gurfein in his dissenting 
j~~~~ opin_ion in Abrahamson ::..:_ Fleschner, that the Act's failure to 
'- y_. ·"' " ~ horize actions at law bars creation of a private riqht for 
-t' ~~mages. Section 214 confers jurisdiction over "all suits in 




t.vz.ZL ~ trV ~ 
~6D.~'
equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules, '3 
([:) ~ 
regulations, or orders thereunder." In contrast, the Investment ~~ 
Company Act of 1940, companion to the Investment Advisors Act, ~~ 
~he Securities Act of 1933, an~e Securities Act of 1934 each 
;:::::::::;-
give courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equi!Y and actions 
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created." See 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. §77v (Act of 
1933); 15 U.S.C. §78aa (Act of 1934). Further, petr notes that 
early versions of the Act simply adopted the language contained 
in the Investment Company Act; but the final version, adopted 
)
after hearings and negotiations with the SEC, omitted mention of 
actions at law • ...-------..... 
Second, petr argues that consideration of the four-part 
test of Cort v. Ash leads to the conclusion that the Act does 
not afford an action for damages: ( 1) The Act is designed to 
protect investors. There is a distinction, however, between a 
statute's goals and the means chosen to reach those goals. 
Although Congress intended to protect investors through 
disclosure and SEC regulation, the Act was not passed for the 
special benefit of investors seeking money damages. 
(2) The legislative history does not clearly indicate 
that Congress intended to create an action for damages. The 
basic approach of the Act was to obtain a compulsory census of 
the industry--a goal irrelevant to a cause of action for 
damages. The Act does not confer jursidiction over actions at 
law. Further, unlike other federal securities acts, no 
provision of the Act provides for civil liability, thus 
indicating that Congress was not ready to impose civil liability 
for violation of the Act. In 1960, Congress amended the Act to 
strengthen the enforcement powers of the SEC but it did not 
provide for actions at law. In 1970 Congress amended both the 
Investment Company Act and the Act. A private cause of action 
was added only to the Investment Company Act. In 1976 and 1977 
bills to extend section 214 to actions at law were introduced 
into Congress, but did not come to a vote in either house. 
( 3) Implying a cause of action is not necessary to 
fulfill the main purposes of the Act. The basic approach of the 
Act is to conduct a compulsory census of the industry. The Act 
also protect advisors from premature disclosure of ongoing SEC 
investigations. Assuming that another purpose is to protect the 
public from fraudulent or negligent investment advisors, 
implication of an action for damages is not necessary to carry 
out the objectives of the Act. See Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 214-26 (1977). Even if creation of 
an action for damages would be consistent with the Act, the 
existence of regulatory remedies demonstrates that implication 
of an action for damages is not necessary. 
(4) Actions for misrepresentation or nondisclosure and 
~ ~ocutriotns for breach of a fiduciary duty are a mainstay of state 
~~pv~- ~ litigation. The complaint charges that the advisor failed 
wv9/ 
..,. 
to register under the Act, that it received excessive fees, and 
that conflict of interest, breach of fidicuary duty and breach 
of trust plagued the relationship between the corporate 
investor, its advisor, and the corporation that controlled both. 
Such issues are often litigated in the state courts. The fact 
that the Act regulates investment advisors on a national scale 
does not mean that a federal cause of action must be created. 
See Piper, 430 U.S. at 40-41. 
Finally, petr argues that implication of a cause of 
action for damages would be inconsistent with the policies 
underlying Blue Chip Stamps ~ Manor Drug Stores, 412 U.S 723 
(1975). Plaintiffs may allege that they were injured by failing 
to take action upon reliance on fraudulent investment adivce. 
This would pose the same problems of proof and judicial 
administration raised when 10b plaintiffs who had not purchased 
securities attmepted to seek legal redress. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether negligent behavior would be actionable under 
the Act. See Ernst~ Ernst~ Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
B. Respondent. Resp notes that petr addressed only the 
issue whether an cause of action for damages could be implied 
under the Act. In fact, resp points out, its complaint seeks 
both equitable relief and damages. The proper question before 
the Court is, therefore, whether a cause of action either for 
damages or equitable relief may be maintained under the Act. 
Resp begins by establishing a history of implied causes of 
action in common law and this Court's precedent. Further, resp 
contends that implication of a cause of action here is 
......__ __ .~_...~ .-...., ~ ~ ...... 
consistent with the genesis of a cause of action under 1 Ob-5. 
~- -- ....___._ . ........_ 
Of particular relevance is the existence of section 215 of the 
Act which provides that contracts in violation of the Act are 
void. The existence of a similar provision in the 1934 Act 
played a prominent role in the early decision to imply a cause 
of action under 10b-5. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. 
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
Second, resp argues that Cort v. Ash test is satisfied 
in this case: ( 1) The Act was passed for the protection of 
investors in their dealings with investment advisors. The 
existence of other purposes behind the Act does not take away 
from this primary goal. ( 2) There is some implicit indication 
that Congress intended to create private rights under the Act; 
there is no indication to the contrary. Although section 214 
does not include actions at law, both the Senate and House 
Reports described the section as comparable to the Invesment 
Company Act, which did contain such a provision. The failure to 
include actions of law within section 214 is unexplained. Most 
likely, the phrase "actions at law" was omitted from section 214 
because no civil liability actions were authorized under the 
Act. Further, section 215, which states that contracts in 
violation of the Act are void, expressly creates a private 
action for equitable relief. In 1960 and 1970, Conqress did not 
consider any proposal to create a right of action under the Act. 
Its failure to create a private right of action is, therefore, 
meaningless. The proposed 1976 and 1977 amendments were intended 
to clarify, not change, the present law. Even if legislative 
history is ambiguous, the existence of section 206, proscribing 
fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive conduct, along with 
section 215, declaring contracts made in violation of the Act 
void, provide implicit congressional intention to create some 
private remedies. ( 3) Implication of a private cause of action 
is consistent with the legislative scheme, and indeed necessary 
to avoid nullification of section 215. The SEC lacks the 
resources to regulate investment advisors completely. ( 4) The 
Act creates a system of federal regulation over investement 
advisors, therefore the guarantee of rights and remedies should 
be uniform across the nation. 
Finally, resp contends that every valid pol~cy -
consideration supports the implication of a cause of action. 
- ........... 
The problem of scienter poses no difficulty because the rule of 
Ernst ~ Ernst will presumably be applied to actions under the 
Act. Implication of a cause of action would not run afoul of 
the concerns expressed in Blue Chip Stamps. There the Court was 
concerned with claims brought by plaintiffs who had no 
relationship with defendants. Here only the 1 imi ted class of 
persons who can assert claims in connection with the making or 
performance of a contract can become plaintiffs. Accordingly, 
there is no possiblity that the plaintiff class can be boundless 
and self-defined. Insofar as a case demands that a plaintiff 
demonstrate what he would have done, courts can establish 
evidentiary guidelines to aid the trier of fact. 
c. The Solicitor General. The SG argues that -
application of the Cort v. Ash test mandates creation of a cause 
of action under the Act: ( 1) The 1 i teral text of section 206, _ ___....._.._ -
prohibiting fraud and deceit practiced upon clients of 
investment advisors, demonstrates that resps are within the 
class for whose especial benefit the Act was enacted. (2) There 
is no indication that Congress intended to foreclose private 
remedies. Nothing in the legislative history demonstrates why 
section 214 was passed in its present form. It was not, however, 
the product of a compromise struck with the investment advisors 
industry, because none of the industry comments directed at 
early forms of the bill dealt with the issue of remedies. In 
fact, the history behind section 214 is neutral. Judge Gurfein 
was incorrect in assuming that the presence of administrative 
and criminal remedies prohibits implication of a private remedy. 
Such a theory would foreclose the implication of any private 
remedies. Section 206 creates duties under the Act. Section 215 
creates a private equitable action and strongly suggests the 
intention to create a private action for damages. Indeed, even 
requitable relief of recission and restitution would include 
monetary relief. Conqress' s subsequent legislative action with 
respect to the Act does not indicate an intention to foreclose 
private relief. (3) Private remedies are necessary to effectuate 
congressional goals. The purpose of the Act was to eliminate 
abuses by investment advisors. The suggestion that it was 
intended simply as a census of the investment advisors industry 
ignores the anti-fraud provisions of the Act and the 
availibility of administrative injunctions and criminal 
penalties for violation of the Act. The availability of private 
damage actions would increase deterrence without conflicting 
with public enforcement. Given the SEC's inability to police 
all investment advisors, a private action would be a helpful 
supplement to federal activities. ( 4) Regulation of investment 
advisors has not been a traditional concern of the states. State 
regulation of investment advisors is limited. State common law 
dotrines based on trust relationships may not be relevant to an 
advisor who sells only his expertise. And use of state law could 
create inconsistent obligations among investment advisors 
located in different states. 
The SG also contends that creation of private remedies 
is consistent with Blue Chip Stamps. The holding in Blue Chip 
Stamps was based upon the explicit "purchase and sale" 
limitation of 10b. Section 206 contains no comparable 
1 imitation, thus reflecting recognition that fraud perpetrated 
by investment advisors may be unconnected to any particular 
sale. Nevertheless, section 206 duties are not open-ended 

in the best position to create a private right of action under 
the Act. Finally, petr, responding to a suggestion made by one 
amicus, contends that it would not be liable under the 
Investment Act even if a cause of action exists. Although these 
contentions were not treated by either lower court, petr 
suggests this Court may wish to consider the issues. 
3. ANALYSIS. The question whether a private action for 
damages should be implied from the Act is fairly s ~mp~e 2.ursuant 
to your analysis in Cannon v. City of Chicago (Powell, J., 
dissenting). None of the parties argues that the legislative 
history indicates without doubt a congressional intent to create 
a private action for damages. They agree that the legislative 
history is essentially ambiguous. --.... 
-
Nor is the language of the 
statute itself demonstrably more helpful. Section 206 prohibits 
~ 
ta~J· 




activities by investment advisors. Essentially it is 
for an investment advisor to defraud any client or 
prospective client, to engage in self-dealing without proper 
or "to engage in any act, practice, or course of 
which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 
~ notice, 
1 
~~ , business 
Section 214 confers j ur isd iction on federal and state courts 
over "all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of this 
subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder." 
Section 215 provides that "[e]very contract made in violation of 
any provision of this subchapter and every contract heretofore 
or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the 
" 
violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice 
in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, 
regulation, or order thereunder shall be void .•.• " as regards 
any person who, in violation of the Act, made or engaged in the 
performance of such a contract. 
These sections taken together do not provide "the most ______ ..... _ ~-
compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an 
.... _ 
action to exist." Cannon v. City of Chicago, slip op. at 20 
(Powell, J. , dissenting) Section 206 creates duties on 
investment advisors enforceable through administrative and 
criminal remedies. S~fails to mention "actions at law" 
perhaps because, as resp urges, the Act creates no civil 
liability. But resp's argument actually supports the conclusion 
that Congress rather neatly distinguished equitable relief, 
available under the Act, from the recovery of damages, which is 
').. \ '7 not available. Finally, section 215 declares contracts void. 
~~·~ ~v_~hether section 215 is a remedy in equity, as resp urges, or 
V"' I.J. ~~e~ely ~-n ~vail able defense, as petr suggests, its presence 
,ffvpr~u~Ar' sugg.es-ts-_."'-th..,at ,_ v  Congress knew exactly how to create rights when it 
~· "'·~ ~ ',... "-·· '· - .. ~ , ... ~ ...... 
~ j;twished to_ do so. 
y}A ? ;(; Application of Cort .'C.:. Ash to this case demonstrates 
~ \ the flaws in that doctrine. I believe that clients of 
investment advisors constitute a class for whose especial 
benefit the statute was enacted. I believe that application of 
the second, and most important, factor demonstrates that 
' . 
Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action for 
._.....-.,,,,, ~ ........... 
damages. Nevertheless, the SG makes a respectable argument that 
legislative intent is neutral. Resolution of the third factor, 
whether creation of a cause of action is consistent or necessary 
to the purposes of the regulatory scheme, depends on a 
legislative-type judgment that weighs the liklihood of greater 
~........ ....._-.....,_ 
deterrence aqainst the costs of increased litigation. Under the 
Piper standard, application of the fourth factor should lead to 
the conclusion that remedies for fraud have been traditionally 
available in the state courts. I would conclude that application -of Cort v. Ash yields a decision that no action for damages -
sh~d. Yet, if one accepts the proposition that the 
second factor is neutral, a respectable argume nt can be made the 
other way. 
Such an expansive view illustrates the dangers of the 
doctrine. Use of Cort v. Ash severs legislative goals from -means. The four-part test fails to recognize that Congress 
exercises skillful discretion to decide which remedies are 
appropriate for which evils. Instead the standard allows any 
court which identifies a legislative purpose protecting a 
defined class of persons to create remedies Congress did not 
create. 
Moreover, Cort ~ Ash places the burden of persuasion 
of the wrong party--where legislative intent is neutral, the 
federal courts should refuse to imply a cause of action. 
Instead, resp and the SG contend that amibguous legislative 
history cuts in their favor. This argument is exactly backwards. 
If it is a good idea to create a private cause of action under 
the Act, Congress can do so. In fact, such legislation was 
introduced without success in 1976 and 1977 and has not been re-
introduced since. 
Furthermore, implication of a cause of action for 
damages would create some, if not all, of the dangers alluded to 
in Blue Chip Stamps. --· Consider, for example, the factual 
situation present in Abrahamson. Plaintiffs were limited 
partners in an investment partnership managed by two general 
partners. In either December 1969 or January 1970, plaintiffs 
learned that the partnership was investing heavily in 
unregistered securities. They withdrew from the partnership at 
the earliest possible date under their contract on September 30, 
1970. They filed a court action in January, 1971. In his 
dissent Judge Gurfein noted that plaintiffs could have sued on 
the basis of fraud as soon as they learned of the partnership's 
investment scheme. Instead, they waited a year. Judge Gurfein 
contended that the difficulty of proving the motivation for the 
plaintiff's failure to act implicates the same concern expressed 
in Blue Chip Stamps that difficult problems of proof would arise 
when a plaintiff claimed that he did not purchase stock because 
of defendant's actions. 421 U.S. at 745-46. As your Blue Chip 
Stamps concurrence notes "[p] rovng, after the fact, what 'one 
would have done' encompasses a number of conjectural as well as 
subjective issues." 421 U.S. at 758 n.2 
The SG's responds to this argument by suggesting that 
the class of plaintiffs would be restricted to persons in 
privity with investment advisors. Although such a limitation 
would not alleviate the difficulty of proving the motivation for 
inaction, it would ease the fear of the Blue Chip Stamps Court 
that a potentially limitless and unidentifiable class of 
plaintiffs may exist. See 421 U.S. at 747. Such a construction 
may conflict with the clear language of the Act, which protects 
prospective clients as well as clients, although that langauge 
could be interpreted to include only persons who made actual 
contact with an investment advisor. My own view is that the 
difficulty of proof is a secondary consideration. As your Blue 
Chip Stamps concurrence emphasized, "[t] he starting point in 
every case involving construction of a statute is the language 
\ itself." In this case, neither the language nor the legislative 
) ---- it \\,. history supports creation of a cause of action for damages. - ' .. ----
On its face, the language of section 215 supports 
implication of a cause of action for equita~ rel~ . The issue 




several forms of equitable relief in his 
a request that thaJefendants ;: enjoined 
..__ 
from carrying out the contract between the ~~stor 
contract be set aside, and~ the --- -and the advisor, that 
defendants return all profits. The district court dismissed the 
complaint in its entirety and the court of appeals affirmed. 
~, ~ · The legislative history behind section 215 is sparse. 
~ f~ Both the Senate and House reports indicate that the section is 
modeled after section 47 of the Investment Company Act. See H.R. -Rep. 76-2639 at 30~ S. Rep. 76-1775 at 23. The language of 
section 47 of the Investment Company Act is virtually identical 
- -----to section 215. The legislative history behind section 47 
indicates that it contains the "usual" provisions pertaining the 
validity of contracts. See H.R. Rep. 76-2639 at 27~ S. Rep. 76-
1775 at 20. Among the usual provisions is section 29 of the 1934 
Act which has been interpreted to mean that contracts made in 
violation of various section of the Act "are voidable at the 
option of the deceived party." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 
735. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 387 
(1970). 
In his Abrahamson dissent, Judge Gurfein argued that 
the existence of 215 does not necessarily command the creation 
of a private action, although he recognized that the creation of 
an equitable action would be consistent with section 214 and the 
notion that it is only actions at law that are inconsistent with 
the stautotry scheme. I believe that an equitable action may be 
even under the stringent standards set forth by your 
dissent in Cannon v. City of Chicago. You recognized that a 
cause of action may be implied if the failure to do so would 
7 
frustrate clear congressional intent. See slip. op. at 5. Here 
Congress has declared certain contracts to be void. Although 
the SEC may be able to employ section 215 as a basis for 
injuctive relief, its failure to do so would bind a party to an 
illegal barg~in unless that party could seek equitable relief on 
its own. Petr contends that section 215 creates only a defense 
to a breach of contract action, but it does not distinguish 
section 29, nor does it offer independent support for such a 
construction. 
Assuming that the language of section 215 does present 
compelling congressional intent to create an equitable cause of 
action under the Act, this Court should note the forms of relief 
that would be available to plaintiffs. According to Judge 
..._.._-
Friendly, section 29 of the 1934 Act "was a legislative 
direction to apply common-law principles of illegal bargain." 
Pearlstein v. Scudder ~German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 
1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting). If section 215 is interpreted 
in a similar manner, then plaintiffs would, 
circumstances,~e entitled :0 ::::::=on : nd 
under apprpriate 
restitution. See 
Contracts, §1535 (1962). Corbin distinguishes 
from damages by noting that "in awarding damages the 
to ~ut the party in as good as position as he would 
have occupied, had the contract been fully performed, while in 
enforcing restitution, the purpose is to require the wrongdoer -- ........ 
to restore what he has received and thus tend to put the injured -- -- -
party in as good a position as that occupied by him before the 
contract was made." Id. at§ 1107. 
t~~ ~ ·I~~~· /~ Certainly restitution under the Investment Advisors Act 
~Q_ woul~fu'andate refund of investment fees. Further, "where a 
W' ...._- ---·-
fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary disposes 
uir of property entrusted to him as fiduciary, he holds any property 
l!.. ~ ... f' . d . h t t . t f h ~v rece1ve 1n exc ange upon a cons rue 1ve trus or t e 
1 
beneficiary." Restatement of Restitution, § 198 (1937). 
Similarly, where property taken by fraud is subsequently 
disposed of, a plaintiff is entitled to enforce either a 
constructive trust on the acquired property or an equitable lien 
to secure his c~-J for reimbursement. 
C; 
Id. at § 202. Under 
these principles, investment advisors would be obligated to 
-, .... 
return the plaintiff's investment plus any profits the advisor 
obtained --
:? 
inally, if a defendant who fraudulently • 
obtained property wrongfully exchange~ it for less valuable 
property, the defendant would be personally liable for the 
balance owed plaintiff. Id. Application of this principle might 
mean that a plaintiff's economic redress would include all of 
his investment loss through the defendant's fraudulent actions. 
The exact breadth of equitable remedies would have to 
be fleshed out by the lower courts on a case-by-case basis. As 
the above examples illustrate there may be a divergence between 
disgorging benefits the defendant received, including 
-'--' -investment fees and profits, and placing the plaintiff in his 
1 8. 
original position, which would demand the payment of all 
investment funds lost due to a violation of the Act. That case 
law which has developed under the contract validity sections has 
focused mainly on section 29 of the 1934 Act. It is not always 
helpful because of the tendency to incorportate discussions of 
equitable remedies with the proper measurement of damages. See 
e.g., Galfand ~Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 814 (2d Cir. 
1976). It does appear, however, that calculation of equitable 
\ 
remedies demands consideration of the type and degree of 
illegality, and the possibility that the plaintiff may obtain an 
underserved windfall. See Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Pat 
Ryan Associates, 496 F.2d 1255, 1265-67 (4th Cir.) cert. denied 
419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Pearlstein~ Scudder~ German, 429 F.2d 
1 1 36, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970)(Friendly, J. , dissenting). 
Furthermore, a request for recission must be made promptly. 
Otherwise a party might be able to safeguard his investment 
simply by noting illegal action, then observing the market. See 
Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969) cert. 
denied 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Myzel ~Field, 386 F.2d 718, 740-
41 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967) cert. denied 390 u.s. 951 (1968). 
Implication of only an equitable cause of action may, 
however, draw fire from those would would favor implying an 
action for damages as well. In particular, resp argues that 
because section 29 has provided support for the creation of a 
pri f ate right of action under 1 Ob, section 215 should play a 
I 
similar role here. There are four responses to this argument: 
(1) Part of the reliance on section 29 is based on the existence 
of a statute of limitations, a feature not present in section 
215. See Fischman~ Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783, 
787 n.4 (2d Cir. 1951). (Other cases, however, relied upon 
section 29 without mention of the statute of 1 imitations. See 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 
1946); see generally~ Chip Stamps, 421 u.s. at 735.) (2) 
Creation of an action for damages under 10b is distinguishable 
because the 1934 Act contains sections explicitly creating civil 
liability, see e.g. , 15 u.s.c. § 78i(e), and conferring 
jurisdiction over actions at law, see 15 u.s.c. § 78aa in 
addition to section 29. The Investment Adivosrs Act contains --
neither express civil liabiity provisions, nor a jurisdictional --- -- ~ 
grant over actions at law. (3) The creation of a cause of action 
under 1 Ob was well-settled long before this Court finally put 
its imprimatur on the doctrine. Private actions under 10b are an 
historical oddity which should not control the continued 
evolution of the law governing implied private rights of action. 
Cf. Cannon v. City of Chicago, slip op. at 7n.6 (Powell J., 
dissenting). (4) The conclusion that Congress intended to create 
private equitable actions does not by itself provide clear and 
convincing support for the proposition that Congress intended to 
create a private action for damages. Indeed, given the 
exclusion of jurisdiction over actions at law, the soundest 
~v . 
conclusion is that Congress carefully distinguished between 
Vi/vv--0 equitable and legal remedies. See text at 11 supra. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, No 77-1645 
Both Petitioner and the Solicitor General have filed 
supplemental briefs which address two issues: (1) The effect of 
this Court's recent decisions on the issue whether a cause of 
action should be implied under the Investment Advisors Act of 
1940, and (2) The proper scope of relief for private plaintiffs 
under the Act. 
1. THIS COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS. Petrs contend that a 
decision in their favor would be consistent with two recent 
Court decisions. In Touche Ross ~ Co. ~ Redington, 47 LW 4732 
(June 18, 1979) the Court held that section 17(a} of the 
2. 
Securities Act of 1934 does not afford a private right of 
action. In Cannon~ University of Chicago, 47 LW 4549 (May 14, 
1979) the Court held that a private litigant may sue to enforce 
Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 
Petr contends that Touche Ross rejects the approach 
that the resps embrace. The Court expressly stated that the 
question of construction of a private right of action is based - ~~--~------~~----------------
upon statutory construction, and not general tort principles. 47 
LW at 4734. In this case, as in Touche Ross, Congress knew how 
to create private actions when it wished to do so. Further, the 
Touche Ross Court emphasized that reference to general remedial 
purposes is not sufficient to justify implication of a cause of 
action. 47 LW at 4737. In this case there are abundant 
indications that Congress did not intent to allow private 
actions. 
~r~ 
lA!· tr} ev2;den~:;_~-i.._:2_.t ... !... n_t_...,_ .... t ... ~---l-~-P-: ... :_ __ a_ ... c_a_u_s_e __ o_f __ a_c_t_ ion. 
Ill"'~ When it passed Title 
In 
. v 
1ts Cannon decision, this Court found abundant 
,....llaouz .... 
IX, Congress expressly authorized 
attorney's fees for private parties, and relied upon judicial 
implication of causes of action. In contrast, the Congress that 
passed to Investment Advisors Act of 1940 did not provide 
attorney's fees for private parties, and it acted before any 
private rights of action had been implied from secuities laws. 
The SG believes that the two cases establish a 
threshold test for application of Cort: does the statutory 
3. 
language demonstrate that the statute was enacted for the 
benefit of a special class of which plaintiff is a member. The 
Act creates federal fiduciary standards, see Sante Fe 
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 ( 1977), which ---
operate for the benefit of investors. Section 206, which 
provides that it shall be unlawful for any investment advisor to 
defraud any client, thus meets the threshold standard. Unlike 
the section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, section 206 prohibits certain 
conduct and creates federal rights in favor of clients. See 
Touche Ross, 47 LW at 4735. 
Second, the SG argues that because the langauge of the 
Act demonstrates that it was enacted for a special class, the 
silent legislative history does not weigh against implication of 
a remedy. The Cannon Court recognized that legislative history 
will usually be silent or ambiguous on implication of a remedy. 
See 47 LW at 4553. F~rther, the SG contends that congressional 
failure to amend the statute in recent years does not mean that 
Congress decided against providi.bg a private cause of action, 4/~ 
because Congress relied upon the judiciary's willingness . to .Je~ 
create private rights of action. 
Third, the SG relies on Cannon to support the 
conclusion that implication of a private right of action is 
consistent with the statutory scheme. In Cannon, the Court 
noted that it had "never withheld a private remedy where the 
statute explicitly confers a benefit on a class of persons and 
4. 
where it does not assure those persons the ability to activate 
and participate in the administrative process contemplated by 
the statute." 47 LW at 4556 n.41. In this case, the Investment 
Advisors Act does not allow participation of defrauded clients 
in admnistrative proceedings, and the injunctive relief usually 
obtained by the SEC will not redress clients• injuries. 
Fourth, the SG repeats his earlier arguement that 
implication of a cause of action is necessary. 
The ) SG makes an additional contention. He notes the 
recent statement that a jurisdictional section "creates no cause 
of action of its own force and effect: it imposes no 
liabilities. The source of the plaintiffs• rights must be 
found, if at al, in the substantive provisions •.• " Touche Ross, 
. -
4 7 LW at 4 7 3 7 • Thus, the SG argues that the ommission of the 
term "actions at law" in setion 214 is of no moment. 
I believe that the two cases generally support the 
petr•s position. Although some of the Cannon language is broad, -----..-
its holding is based on the Court's perception of congressional 
intent and reliance on the judiciary's willingness to imply 
causes of action. Title IX was passed at a time when Congress 
$ 
may have reasonably believed that cour t;,.. provide private 
remedies. As petrs note, the same was not true when Congress 
passed the Investment Advisors Act. The SG attempts to 
circumvent this point by arguing that Congress• failure to amend 
the Act in recent years was in reliance upon the expectation of 
5. 
judicial action. But the SG relies on a Senate report that 
expressly recognized the split in the lower courts over the 
issue of whether a cause of action could be implied under the 
Act. See S. Rep. No. 94-910 8-9 (1976). Although the Senate 
committee recommended that section 214 be amended to add the 
term "action at law", that amendment was not adopted by 
Congress. It thus appears that Congress was on full notice that 
/ 
courts would not necessarily imply causes of action under the 
Act. 
On the other hand, Touche Ross is helpful precedent to 
the petr. The Court recognized that the question of implication 
of a statutory cause of action is an issue of statutory ' 
construction, and is not based on general tort principles. 
I 
Instead, "our task is 1 imi ted solely to determining whether 
Congress intended to create the private right of action •..• " 47 
LW at 4734. Further, the Court commented on the application of 
Cort v. Ash. Although Cort set forth four factors, the Court 
has not said they are entitled to equal weight. The central 
action. Indeed, the first three inquiries in the Cort test are ----
traditional measures of legislative intent. 4 7 LW a t 4 7 3 6 • 
The Court 1 s explanation that the role of the Cort test is to 
divine legislative intent rebuts the proposition avidly pursued 
by the SG that neutral legislative intent favors implication of 





2. SCOPE ·oF REMEDIES. Petr contends that no 
<::.:: 
distinction should be made between equitable and legal relief. ] 
Petr fears that this Court's holding that equitable relief is 
-:::::::::::::- - -- - , 
available would allow the award of money damages. See e.g. ____ _, ----- -
Chasins v. Smith Barney ~ Co~, Inc. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 
1970); Janigan ~Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965). 
The SG, on the other hand, argues that both legal and 
equitable remedies should be available. The SG contends that 
equitable principles alone will not fully redress an client's -----injuries. 
....... ........._... 
Moreover, the SG argues that the lower courts never 
addressed the scope of remedies available under the Act. 
Therefore, this Court should allow those issues to be worked 
through by the lower courts. 
I believe that petr's fear~ about the failure of courts ........__..... ,....,. _............... _.. 
to distinguish between equitable relief and damages is well - -
~· Nevertheless, the cases petr cites do not support its ~ 
apprehension. In Chasins, the court awarded damages in a 10b-5 
action, which was clearly appropriate because both equitable and 
legal relief are available. In Janigan the court noted that 
equitable relief can force a defendant who has engaged in 
fraudulent action to disgorge his profits. Although this amount 
may be substantial, it is different than the right to recover 
one's expectancy, which is the measurement for damages. 
introduced cases that clearly 
deomonstrate the distinction between legal and equitable relief, 
~~----------~,-~-,-------~~--~>----~,_ 
- ~, _____________
yet the distinction will be of major importance should this 
Court decide that the Investment Advisors Act only allows he 
award of equitable relief. If this path were followed, it ~ould 
be important to warn the lower courts that equitable relief does 
...... ~ .._,._,. .._.. """-' ---
not allow a plaintiff to be put in the position that he would -- - ~--------~~----~'-------~----~~-----------------------------------the contract been carried out. Beyond that 
instruction, this Court will have to rely on lower courts to 
apply equitable principles of recission and restitution on a 
case-by-case basis. Because "Congress intended the Investment 
Advisors Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for 
investment advisors," Santa Fe Industries, In£· ~ Green, 430 ---------- ""-----
U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977), the extent and nature of an advisor's 
duties depend on the nature of the relationship and the 
circumstances of each case. See 2 Frankel, The Regulation of 
Money Managers 344, 645-46 (1978). Courts would also have to 
determine whether an advisor's violation of the Act amounts to 
fraud. 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 77-1645 
s, ~~~~·~J~~ 
~~~<t,Jt...t_ +~~  
In a typ~~.#~c~se,~ - ~ £aintiff alleging violation j of 
-.~__,~-e-r. ~r-· ~~ 
the Act might be able to seek 1ve diff~types of monet ry 
relief. - Assume that a plaintiff gave an advisor $100,000 to 
invest in January, 1978 and discovered in December, 1978 that 
his account had shrunk to $5,000. Plaintiff could seek (1) the 
return of the $5,000 ( 2) the return of any investment fees he 
paid from Janurary to December, ( 3) the disgorgement of any 
profits the advisor made through self-dealing, (4) the payment 
of the $95,000 necessary to return him to the position he was in 
when he made the investment, or ( 5) the amount of profit he 
'-· 
' . 
would have made if the advisor had not violated the Act. 
The first two catagories are clearly available as part 
of the equitable relief of recission and restitution. The fifth 
clearly is not, because it measures the plaintiff's expectancy--
the proper measure for damages. 
As~ng that the advisor has acted as a fiduciary, the 
/hA. 
Restatement ~Restitution requires that he disgorge any prof~s 
he has received from the transaction. The same is true if the 
advisor has acted fraudulently. In these circumstances, 
therefore, catagory three relief would be available. 
The Restatement also states that a person who 
fraudulently obtains property ......___-- and who exchanges it for less 
valuable property is liable for the balance owed the plaintiff. 
Thus if the advisor acted fraudulently, the plaintiff could 
recover catagory four costs also. 
The ability of a plaintiff to obtain any of the forms 
of equitable relief is contingent, of course, upon the proper 
application of other equitable principles. For example, a 
request for recission must be made promptly. 
If the Court decides that equitable, but not legal, 
relief is available, I would suggest that the Court either (a) 
allow lower courts to flesh out the issue of scope of relief, or 





equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules, '3 
~ ~ 
regulations, or orders thereunder." In contrast, the Investment ~~ 
Company Act of 1940, companion to the Investment Advisors Act, ~h 
~he Securities Act of 1933, an~e Securities Act of 1934 each 
~ 
give courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equi_E:y and actions 
at law brouqht to enforce any liability or duty created." See 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. §77v (Act of 
1933); 15 U.S.C. §78aa (Act of 1934). Further, petr notes that 
early versions of the Act simply adopted the language contained 
in the Investment Company Act; but the final version, adopted 
}
after hearings and negotiations with the SEC, omitted mention of 
actions at law. 
~
Second, petr argues that consideration of the four-part 
test of Cort v. Ash leads to the conclusion that the Act does 
not afford an action for damages: ( 1) The Act is designed to 
protect investors. There is a distinction, however, between a 
statute's goals and the means chosen to reach those goals. 
Although Congress intended to protect investors through 
disclosure and SEC regulation, the Act was not passed for the 
special benefit of investors seeking money damages. 
(2) The legislative histo'ry does not clearly indicate -
that Congress intended to create an action for damages. The 
basic approach of the Act was to obtain a compulsory census of 
the industry--a goal irrelevant to a cause of action for 
damages. The Act does not confer jursidiction over actions at 
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1 
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress had 
found to exist in the investment advisers industry. The 
question in this case is whether that Act creates a private 
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of persons 
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it. 
The respondent, a shareholder of petitioner Mortgage Trust 
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district 
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a 
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as 
defendants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the 
Trust's investment adviser, Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA, 
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Cor-
poration (Transamerica), all of which are petitioners in this 
case.1 
1 Hereinafter "the petitioners" refers to the petitioners other than the 
Trust . The Trust is a real estate investment trust within the meaning of 
§§ 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code. TAMA, in addition to advis-
ing the Tnust, managed it:s day-to-day operat10ns. Transamerica is the 
sponsor of the Trust and the parent of Land CapitaL Land Capital is-
the parent of TAMA, through a subsidiary, and sold the Trust its initial 
SEE PAGES q I? J 
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2 TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS 
The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in 
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty 
of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty. The com-
plaint set out three causes of action, each said to arise under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.2 ·The first alleged that 
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was 
unlawful because TAMA and Transamerica were not regis-
tered under the Act and because the contract had provided 
for grossly excessive compensation. ·The second alleged that 
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by 
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land 
Capital. The third alleged that the petitioners had misap-
propriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit 
of other companies affiliated with Transamerica. The com-
plaint sought injunctive relief to restrain further performance 
of the advisory contract, rescission of the contract, restitution 
of fees and other considerations paid by the Trust, an account-
ing of illegal profits, and an award of damages. 
The trial court ruled that the Investment Advisers Act con-. 
fers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the 
complaint.8 The Court of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237, 
holding that "implication of a private right of action for-
injunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plain-
tiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting 
the legislation." !d., at 239.4 We granted certiorari to con-
portfolio of investments. Several of the individual trustees were at the 
time of suit affili1Lted with TAMA, Tran::;america, or other subsidiaries of 
Transamerica. 
2 Each cau::;e of action wa:s stated as a derivative shareholder':; claim 
and restated as a shareholders class claim. 
8 The pertinent orders of the Di::;trict. Court. are unreported . 
4 The District Court was of the view that it was without subject-matter · 
juri:::uiction of the respondent 'H suit. The Court of Appeal:; rerharacter-
ized the District Court's order dismissing the suit as properly based upon 
the respondent's failuN> to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6), noting that the respondent 's suit was:; 
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sider the important federal question presented. -U.S.-
(1978). 
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides 
for a private cause of action. The only provision of the Act 
that authorizes any suits to enforce the duties or obligations 
created by it is § 209, which permits the Securities Excha.nge 
Commission (Commissiou) to bring suit in a federal district 
court to enjoin violations of the Act or the rules promulgated 
under it.0 The argument is made, however, that the clients 
apparently within the District Court's general federal-question jurisdic-
tion undrr 28 U.S. C.§ 1331. 575 F. 2d, at 239, n. 2. 
The Court of AppeallS in thi:; ca~Se followed the Courts of Appeal:; for the 
Fifth and Second Circuits, which al~So have held that private causes of 
action may be mainhtined under the Act. See Wilson v. Fi1'st Houston 
Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschne1', 
568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977). 
8 Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provides in part al:l follows: 
"(e) Whenever it ~hall appear to the Commission that any pert>'on 
has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practice con-
stituting a violation of a11y provision of thi:; subchapter, or of any rule, 
regulation, or order hereunder, or that any per:son has aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured, is aiding, abetting, counsel-
ing, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel, 
command, induce, or procU11C :such a Yiolutiou, it may ill it,; di::~cretion 
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, or the 
proper United States court of auy Territory or other place subject to the 
juri;;diction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices and to 
enforce compliance with thi:; subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order 
hereunder. Upon a showi11g that such person has engaged, is engaged, or 
i;; about to engage in any such act or practice, or in aiding, abetting, coun-
seling, commanding, inducing, or procuring any such act or practice, a per~ 
manent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order shall be 
granted without bond. Tl1e CommiH~ion may transmit such evidence as 
may be available concerning any violation of the provisions of this sub-
chapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, to the Attorney 
General, who, in hi:; discretion, may institute the appropnate criminal 
procedingr:; under this subchapt{'r." 
The language in § 209 (e) that authorizes the Commis~ion to obtain an 
injunction against per~ons "aiding, abetting, . .. or procuring" violations 
of the Act wa8 added to the st~~tute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. 
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the 
Act and that courts should therefore imply a private cause of 
action in their favor. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
-U.S.-,-; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78; .T.I. Case v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, -. 
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, 
either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of 
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. -, -; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, -
U. S., at -; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court 
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of 
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies 
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g., 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be deter-
mined is whether Congress intended to create the private 
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear. 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at-; Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, - U. S., at-. We accept this as 
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues 
presented by the case before us. 
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute 
itself. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at-; 
Cannon v. Un·iversity of Chicago,-- U. S., at-; Santa Fe 
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation 
of a private right of action can fairly be inferred from the· 
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which 
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advis-
ers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or to engage in 
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,"' 
or to eugage in specified transactions with clients without. 
77-1645-0PlNION 
"fRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISOHS v. LEWia 5 
making required disclosures.6 The second is § 215, which pro-
vides that contracts whose formation or performance would 
violate the Act "shall be void ... as regards the rights of" 
t,he violator and knowing successors in interest/ 
6 Section 200, 15 U.S. C. § 80b-G, read;; as follows: 
"§ SOb-6. Prohibited transactions by inve;;tment advi::;ers. 
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by u:se of the mai!t~ 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or 
indirectly-
" (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or 
prospective client; 
"(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or cour:;e of bu:siness which 
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client; 
"(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any 
security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for 
a person other thm1 such client, knowingly to effect uny sale or purchase 
of any security for the account of ::;uch client., without. disclosing to such 
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in 
which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such trans-
action. The prohibitions of this paragra.ph i:lhal not apply to any trans-
action with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is 
not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such trammction; 
" ( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or cour::;e of business which i:s fraud-
ulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commi:;f:lion shall, for the purpo:;es 
of thi,; paragraph ( 4) by rulei:l and regulations define, and prescribe 
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses 
of bu::;iness as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 
Section 206 (4) was added to the statute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that 
time Congress also extended the provision~ of § 206 to all investment 
adviser:;;, whether or not such advi~ers were required to register under 
§ 203 of the Aet. Ibid. 
7 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-15, read::; in part as follows: 
"§ SOb-15. Validity of contracts 
"(b) Evrry contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter 
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which 
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any rrlation:ship or prac-
tice in violation of any provision of thi:; subchapter, or any rule, regula-
tion, or order thereunder, shall be void ( 1) a:; rrga.rds the right~ of any 
per:son who, in violation of any such proviHion, rule, regulation, or order, 
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It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit 
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215, 
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As we have pre-
viously recognized, § 206 establishes "federal fiduciary stand-
ards" to govern the conduct of investment advisers, Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S., at 471, n. 11; Burks v. Lasker, 
- U. S. -, -, n. 10; SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
B·ureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 191-192. Indeed, the Act's legis-
lative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to 
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No. 
2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 28 (1940); S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th 
Coug., 3d Sess., 21 ( 1940); SEC, Report on Investment Trusts 
and Investment Companies (Investment Counsel and Invest-
ment Advisory Services), H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 27-30 (1939). But whether Congress intended addi-
tionally that these provisions would be enforced through pri-
vate litigation is a different question. 
On this question the legislative history of the Act is en-
tirely silenl:r-a state of affairs not surprising when it is remem-
bered that the Act concededly does not explicitly provide any 
private remedies whatever. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, supra, - U. S., at -. But while the absence of 
anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention 
to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to the 
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his posi-
tion. This Court has held that the failure of Congress 
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably incon-
sistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy avail-
able. Cannon v. University of Chicago, - U. S., at -. 
Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language or 
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any l:mch contract, and 
(2) as rPgard:; thr rights of uny per~on who, not being a purty to such 
contmd, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge 
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of ~uch con-
tract was in violation of any such provi~ion ." 
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skucture of the statute, or in the circumstances of its 
enactment. 
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian .. 
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief 
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of v6id .. 
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the 
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be 
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforce-
ment of an investment advisers contract. But the legal con-
sequences of voidness a.re typically not so limited. A per~on 
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a 
court to have the contract rescinded and to obtain restitution 
of consideration paid. See Deckert v. Independence Corp., 
311 U. S. 282. 289; Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525; 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th edition, §§ 881 and 1092. 
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable 
provision, § 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S. C.§ 77cc (b), confers a "right to rescind" a contract void 
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in gen .. 
eral have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause 
of action for rescission or similar relief. E. g., Kardon v .. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (DCED Pa. 
1946); see III Loss, Securities Regulation 1758-1759 (2d ed .. 
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S. 723, 735. 
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared 
in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the 
customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including 
the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction 
against continued operation of the contract, and for restitu-
tion.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was 
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain an action 
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers 
contract.0 
We view quite differently, however, the respondent's claims 
for damages and other monetary relief under § 206. Unlike 
§ 215, § 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in 
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability 
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the 
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction 
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy 
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. 
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, 
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra, 
414 U. S., at 458; Sec'Urities Protection Investment Corp. v. 
Barbo'Ur, 421 U. S. 412, 419; T: 1. M·. E., Inc. v. United States, 
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and 
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206. 
First, under ~ 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal 
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Sec-
ond, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in 
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, 
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by 
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons 
who violate the Act, including§ 206. In view of these express 
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is 
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to 
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University 
of Chicago,- U.S., at- (PowELL, J., dissenting) . 
§ 215 would be raised only in stale court. But we decline to adopt such 
an anom<Llows construetion without some indication that Congress in fact 
wi~hed to remit the litigation of a federal right to the state courts. 
9 Juri;;diction of ;;uch i"uit;; would exist under § 214 which, though 
referring in terms only to "suits in equity to enjoin viola tion:s," would 
equally sustain actions where simple declaratory rE'lief or rescission is: 
sought. 
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Even settled rules of statutory COlJstruction could yield, of 
course, to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent. 
Securities Protection Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 
419; Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458. But what evidence of 
intent exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs 
against the implication of a private right of action for a mone-
tary award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities 
laws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the 
Investment Company Act which was enacted as companion 
legislation, Congress expressly authorized private suits for 
damages in prescribed circumstances.1° For example, Con-
gress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresenta-
tions contained in an underwriter's registration statement in 
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and for certain mate-
rially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. "Obviously, then, when Congress wished 
to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so 
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, -
U. S., at 11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458; 
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S., at 471. The fact 
that it enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here 
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling 
to impose any potential monetary liability to a private suitor. 
See Abrahamson v. F'lechsner, 508 F. 2d, at- (Gurfein, J., 
dissenting) . 
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's 
substantive provisions was paralleled in the jurisdictional sec-
1 0 See Securities Act of 1933, §§ ll and 12, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k and 771; 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9 (e), 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 71i (e), 78p (b), and 78r; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935, §§ 16 (a) and 17 (b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 79p (H) and 79q (b); Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939, § 323 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a); Investment 
Company Act of 1940, § 30 (f), 15 U.S. C. § SOa-29 (f) . 
1 
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tion, § 214.11 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated 
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liab·ility or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added). 
SeeS. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (introduced by Sen. Wag-
ner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (in-
troduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the 
bill in the Senate, representatives of the investment advisers 
industry and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the 
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was 
enacted as § 214 first appeared in this compromise version of 
the bill. See Confidential Committee Print, S. 3580, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally 
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both 
omitted any references to "actions at law" or· to "liability." 12 
n Section 214, 15 U. S. C. § 801.>-14, provides: 
"§ SOb-14. Jurisdiction of offen~c"' and ::mill'. 
"The district courts of the United States and the United States courts 
of any Territory or other place :subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have jurisdiction of violation:; of thi:; subchapter or the rules, 
regulations, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Terri-
torial courts, of all suit:; in equity to enjoin any violation of thi::; ~Sub­
chapter or the rules, regulations, or order:; thereunder. Any criminal 
proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act. or tran::;a.ction 
con:stituting the violation occurred. Any suit or Ltction to enjoin any 
violation of this :;ubchapter or rules, regulatJOn:;, or order~ thereunder; 
m.1y be brought in any ::;uch district or in the district wherein the de-
fendant is an inhabitant or tram;act::; business, and proce::;::; in such cases 
may be served in any district of which the defendant i:s an inhabitant or· 
transactR bu:siness or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgment::; 
and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in section::; 
225 and 347 of Title 28, and section 7, as amended, of the Act entitled 
'An Act to e:stablish a court of appeab for the Di::;trict of Columbia, ' 
approved February 9, 1893. No costs shall be a::;sei:i<>ed for or agam::;t 
the Commi::;sion in any proceeding under thb subchapter brought by or 
ttgainst the Corruni:ssiou iu any court ." 
lt The respondent argues that the omi::;:oio11 of any refert>uce in § 214 
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a jurisdic~ 
tiona} provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a 
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action 
for anything beyond limited equitable relief.18 
Helying on the factors identified in Cort v. Ash, supra, the 
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that 
our inquiry in this case cannot stop with the intent of Con-
gress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and 
to "actions at la.w" b without relevance because jurbdiction over such 
cases as this would often exist under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general 
federal-que.-stion jurisdiction Htatute, unci because there was no expre~s 
statement thal the omission wa.-s intended to preclude private remedies. 
But the respondent concedes that t.he language of § 214 was probably 
narrowed in view of the absence from the Advisers Act of uny exprcs::; 
provi::;ion for a private cau:;e of action for damagr:;. We agree, but find 
the omis:;ion inconsistrnt more generally with an intent on the part of 
Congress to make sueh n remedy available. 
18 Congress amended the Investment Ccmpany Act in 1970 to create 
o. narrowly circumscribed right of action for damage:; against. investment 
adviser:; to registered investment companies. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. 
L. 91-547, 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U.S. C. § 80a-35 (b). While subEequent 
lrgislation can disclose little or nothing of the intent of Congress in 
euacting earlier laws, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. supra, 
375 U. S., at 199-200, the 1970 amendment~; to the companion Act is 
another clear indicaticn that Congres::; knew how to confer a private right 
of action when it wished to rlo so. 
In 1975 the Commi~;sion ~ubmitted a proposal to Congress that would 
have amended § 214 to extend juri~diction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy , to "actions a.t law" under the Act. See S. 2849, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sel:i:s., § 6 (1976) . The Commil:i:;ion was of the view that the 
amendment also would confirm the existence of a private right of action 
to rnforoo the Act's sub;:;tantive provision::;. See Hearings on S. 2849 
before thr Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2 Se~s ., 17 ; Hearings on 
H. R. 12981 and H. R. 13737 before the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the House Committee on lnter:;tate and Foreign 
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Ses~. , 36-37. The Senate Committee reported 
favorably on the provision as proposed by the Commis:sion, but the bill 
'<lid not come to a vote in either House. 
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated to state 
law. We rejected the same contentions last Term in Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these 
factors standing alone justified the implication of a private 
right of action under § 17 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. We said in that case: 
"It is true that in Cort v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth 
four factors that it considered "relevant" in determining 
whethE>r a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one. But the Court did not decide 
that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The 
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to 
crea.tE', either expressly or by implication, a private cause 
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in 
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative 
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S., at 78-are ones 
traditionally reliE>d upon in determining legislative in-
tent." - U. S., at -, -. 
The statute in Touche Ross by its terms neither granted 
private rights to the members of any identifiable class, nor 
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. To·uche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, supra, at -. In those circumstances it was 
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available. 
Rection 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended 
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. 
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect 
advisers' clients does not require the implication of a private 
cause of action for damages on their behalf. 'L'o·uche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at -; Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, supra, at -; Securities Investor Protection 
Corp. v. Barbo·ur, S'upra, at 421. The dispositive question re-
mains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy. 
Having answered that question in the negative, our iuquiry 
is at an end. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that there 
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 to void an investment advisers contract, 
but that the Act confers no other private causes of action, 
legal or equitable." Accordingly, the judgmer1t of the Court 
of Appeals is affirrned in part and reversed in part, and the 
case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
11 Where re,.;ei~sion is awardrcl, the n•. cinclin~ party mny of rourRe l1aYe 
restitution of the ron:;iderntion given under the rontra<'t, It's~ any value 
conferred by the other party. }lp;;tit.ut.ion would not, howeYcr, n1rlnde 
compC'nsation for any diminution in the value of t lw l'<'~eindin~ party':<" 
investment. alle~rd to havr rr~nltt:>d from the adviH<'r·~ af'tion or mart ion 
Sueh relief rould provide h.' · indirPrt ion t lw Pqn iv:lll•n t of :1 pri,·n tp dnm:tg;<' 
remPdy that we ha\'(' ron<'lnded C'ongre~s did lHll f•onfl'l 
AVo ~u \Jll..ttjJ. i1US1:;1C9 
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Mn. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80 
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress 1ad 
found to exist in the investment advisers industry. The 
question in this case is whether that Act creates a pr vate 
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of pe ous 
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it. 
The respondent, a shareholder of petitioner Mortgage Tru 
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district 
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a 
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as 
defendants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the 
Trust's investment advise!', Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA, 
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Cor-
poration (Transamerica), all of which are petitioners in this 
case.1 
1 Hereinafter "the petitioners" refers to the petitioners other than the 
Trust. The Trust is a real e!:itate investment trust within the meaning of 
§§ 856-858 of the Internitl Revenue Code. TAMA, in addition to advi::;-
ing the Tru:s1, mnnaged it~ day-to-day OJlPration~ . Tram;amerira i::; 1hr 
sponf<or of the Trust and the parent of Land Capital. Land Capital is-
the parent of TAMA, through a subsidiary, and sold the Trust its initial 
StE 
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The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in 
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty 
of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty. The com-
plaint set out three causes of action, each said to arise under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.2 ·The first alleged that 
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was 
unlawful because TAMA and Transamerica were not regis-
tered under the Act and because the contract had provided 
for grossly excessive compensation. ·The second alleged that 
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by 
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land 
Capital. ·The third alleged that the petitioners had misap-
propriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit 
of other companies affiliated with Transamerica. The com-
plaint sought injunctive relief to restrain further performance 
of the advisory contract, rescission of the contract, restitution 
of fees and other considerations paid by the Trust, an account-
ing of illegal profits, and an award of damages. 
The trial court ruled that the Investment Advisers Act con-. 
fers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the 
complaint.3 The Court of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237, 
holding that "implication of a private right of action for-
injunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plain-
tiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting 
the legislation." !d., at 239.4 We granted certiorari to con-
portfolio of investments. Several of the individual trustees were at the 
time of suit affiliated with TAMA, Transamerica, or other subsidiaries of 
Tran:samcrica. 
2 Each cause of action was stated as a derivative shareholder's claim 
and restated as a shareholders class claim. 
8 The pertinent orders of the District Court are unreported. 
4 The District Court was of the view that it was without subject-matter· 
juri:;dirtion of the respondent 'H suit. The Court of Appeals recharacter-
ized the Dit;trict Court's order dismissing the suit as properly ba:sed upon 
the respondent's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (6), noting that the res~ndent's suit wa ; 
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sider the important federal question presented. -U. S.-
(1978). 
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides 
for a private cause of action. The only provision of the Act 
that authorizes any suits to enforce the duties or obligations 
created by it is § 209, which permits the Securities Exchange 
Commission (Commission) to bring suit in a federal district 
court to enjoin violations of the Act or the rules promulgated 
under it." The argument is made, however, that the clients 
apparently within the District Court's general federal-qurstion jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S. C.§ 1331. 575 F. 2d, at 239, n. 2. 
The Court of Appeals in thi:; cnse followed the Courts of Appeab for the 
Fifth and Second Circuits, which also have held that private cau::>es of 
action may be maintnined under the Act. See Wilsan v. First Houston 
Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 
568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977) . 
~Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provide:; in part as follows : 
"(e) Whenever it 8hall appear to the Commission that any perb'ou 
has engaged, is ,engaged, or i:; about 1 o engage in any act or practice con-
stituting a violation of <UlY provision of this :;ubchapter, or of any rule, 
regulation, or order hereunder, or that any person has aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured, is aiding, abetting, counsel-
ing, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel, 
comm:.wd, induce, or procmX' such :~ \'iolation, it, may iu its di:;cretiou 
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, or the 
proper United States court of any Territory or other place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practice>; and to 
enforce compliance with this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order 
hereunder. Upon a showing that such person has engaged, is engaged, or 
i::; about to engage in any such act or practioo, or in aiding, abetting, coun-
seling. commanding, induciug, or procuring any such act or practice, a per-
manent or temporary injunction or decree or rest raining order shall be 
granted without bond. The Commission mny transmit such evidence as 
may be available concerning any violation of the provisions of this sub-
chapter, or of any mle, regulation, or order thereunder, to the Attorney 
General, who, in hi~> discretion, may institute the appropriate criminal 
procedings under this subchapter." 
The language in § 209 (e) that authorizes the Commission to obtain an 
injunction again::>t persons "aiding, abetting, . .. or procuring" violations 
of the Act wns added to the statute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. 
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the 
Act and that courts should therefore imply a private cause of 
action in their favor. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
- U. S. -, -; Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78; J. I. Case v. 
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, -. 
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, 
either expressly or by implication , is basically a matter of 
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. -, -; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, -
U. S., at -; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court 
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of 
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies 
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g., 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be deter-
mined is whether Congress intended to create the private 
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear. 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at-; Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, - U. S., at-. We accept this as 
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues 
presented by the case before us. 
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute 
itself. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at-; 
Carmon v. University of Ch,icago,- U. S., at-; Santa Fe 
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation 
of a private right of action can fairly be inferred from the, 
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which 
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advis-
ers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .. . or to engage in 
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client," 
or to engage in specified transactions with clients without, 
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making required disclosures.6 The second is § 215, which pro-
vides that contracts whose formation or performance would 
violate the Act "shall be void ... as regards the rights of" 
the violator and knowing successors in interest.7 
6 Section 206, 15 U.S. C.§ SOb-6, read:; a!S follows: 
"§ SOb-6. Prohibited tnm!:lactiom; by inve!:ltment advi::;ers. 
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by u::;e of the mails 
or nny means or instrumentality of inter::;tate commerce, directly or 
indirectly-
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or 
prospective client; 
"(2) to engage in any trnnsaction, practice, or course of bu::;ine~Ss which 
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any chent or pro!Spective client; 
"(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any 
security to or purchase any security from a rlient, or acting as broker for 
a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any salP or purchase 
of any security for the account of ::;uch client, without disclosing to such 
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in 
which he i:; acting and obtaining the con::;ent of the client to such trans-
action. The prohibitions of this paragraph shal not apply to any trans-
action with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer i8 
not acting as an inve:;tment adviser in relation to such tram;action; 
" ( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or cour::;e of bu:;ineSli which is fraud-
ulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commi:;:;ion shall, for the purpo:;es 
of thi:; paragraph ( 4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe 
means rea::;onably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses 
of business at> are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 
Section 206 (4) was added to the ::;tatute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that 
Lime Congress also extended the provision» of § 206 to all investment 
adviser.o, whether or not such advi~er:; were required to regi:ster under 
§ 203 of the Act. Ibid. 
1 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-15, read:s in part as follows: 
"§ SOb-15. Validity of contracts 
"(b) EvPry contract made iu violation of any provision of this subchapter 
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which 
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relation~hip or prac-
tice in violation of any provision of this :subchapter, or any rule, regula-
tion, or order thereunder, ~hall be void (1) as regards the rights of any 
person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order, 
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It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit 
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215, 
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As we have pre-
viously recognized, § 206 establishes "federal fiduciary stand-
ards" to govern the conduct of investment advisers, Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S., at 471, n. 11; Burks v. Lasker, 
- U. S. -, -, n. 10; SEC v. Capital Ga'ins Research 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 191-192. Indeed, the Act's legis-
lative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to 
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No. 
2639, 76th Con g., 3d Sess., 28 ( 1940) ; S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., 21 (1940); SEC, Report on Investment Trusts 
and Investment Companies (Investment Counsel and Invest-
ment Advisory Services), H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 27-30 (1939). But whether Congress intended addi-
tionally that these provisions would be enforced through pri-
vate litigation is a different question. 
On this question the legislative history of the Act is en-
tirely silent--a state of affairs not surprising when it is remem-
bered that the Act concededly does not explicitly provide any 
private remedies whatever. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, supra,- U. S., at-. But while the absence of 
anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention 
to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to the 
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his posi-
tion. This Court has held that the failure of Congress 
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably incon-
sistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy avail-
able. Cannon v. University of Chicago, - U. S., at -. 
Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language or 
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, aud 
(2) a~:~ rrgttrdo; the rights of any pcr~on who, not being a party to such 
contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge 
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of ~uch con-
tract was in violation of any such provi~ion ." 
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stfucture of the statute, or in the circumstances of its 
enactment. 
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian .. 
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief 
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of vtlid .. 
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the 
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be 
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforce. 
ment of an investment advisers contract. But the legal con-
sequences of voidness a.re typically not so limited. A per~on 
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a 
court to have the contract rescinded and to obtain restitution 
of consideration paid. See Deckert v. Independence Corp., 
311 U. S. 282. 289; Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525; 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th edition. §§ 881 and 1092. 
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable 
provision, § 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S. C. § 77cc (b) , confers a "right to rescind" a contract void 
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in gen-
eral have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause 
of action for rescission or similar relief. E. g., Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (DCED Pa. 
1946); see III Loss, Securities Regulation 1758- 1759 (2d ed .. 
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S. 723, 735. 
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared 
in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the 
customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including 
the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction 
against continued operation of the contract, and for restitu-
tion.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was 
s One possibility, of course, is that Congress intended that claims ·u.nde't 
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain an action 
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers 
contract.9 
We view quite differently, however, the respondent's claims 
for damages and other monetary relief under § 206. Unlike 
§ 215, § 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in 
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability 
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the 
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction 
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy 
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. 
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, 
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra, 
414 U. S., at 458; Securities Protection Investment Corp. v. 
Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 419; T. I. M·. E., Inc. v. United States, 
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and 
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206. 
First, under ~ 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal 
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Sec-
ond, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in 
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, 
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by 
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons 
who violate the Act, including§ 206. In view of these express 
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is 
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to 
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University 
of Chicago,- U.S., at- (PowEr ... L, J., dissenting) . 
§ 215 would be rai::;ecl only in state court. But we decline to adopt such 
an anomalous con~truction without some indication that Congress in fact 
wi-;hed to remit the litigation of a federal right to the state courts. 
9 Juri~diction of such suits would exist under § 214 which , though 
referring in terms only to "suits in equity to enjoin violation::;," would 
equally sustain actions where ::;imple declaratory relief or re::;cission is-
sought. 
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Even settled rules of statutory construction could yield, of 
course, to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent. 
Securities Protection Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 
419; Amtrak, supra, 414 U.S., at 458. But what evidence of 
intent exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs 
against the implication of a private right of action for a mone-
tary award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities 
laws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the 
Investment Company Act which was enacted as companion 
legislation , Congress expressly authorized private suits for 
damages in prescribed circumstances.10 For example, Con-
gress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresenta-
tions contained in an underwriter's registration statement in 
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and for certain mate-
rially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. "Obviously, then , when Congress wished 
to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so 
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,-
U. S., at 11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458; 
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S., at 471. The fa.et 
that it enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here 
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling 
to impose any potential monetary liability to a private suitor. 
See Abrahamson v. Flechsner, 508 F. 2d, at- (Gurfein , J., 
dissenting) . 
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's 
substantive provisions was paralleled in the jurisdictional sec-
1 0 See Securities Act of 1933, §§ J 1 and 12, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k and 771'; 
Securities ExchangE> Act of 1934, §§ 9 (e) , 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 71i (e), 78p (b) , and 78r ; Public Utilit y Holding Company Act of 
1935, §§ 16 (a) and 17 (b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 79p (a ) and 79q (b) ; Trust 
IndenturE> Act of 1939, § 323 (a ) , 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a) ; Investment 
Company Act of 1940, § 30 (f), 15 U.S. C.§ 80a-29 (f) . 
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tion, § 214.11 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated 
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liab·ility or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added). 
SeeS. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess .. 98 (introduced by Sen. Wag~ 
ner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (in-
troduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the 
bill in the Senate, representatives of the investment advisers 
indus try and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the 
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was 
enacted as § 214 first appeared in this compromise version of 
the bill. See Confidential Committee Print, S. 3580, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally 
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both 
omitted any references to "actions at law" or to "liability." J 2 
tt Section 214, 15 U. S. C. § 801.>-14, provides: 
"§ 80b-14. .Jurisdiction of offem;e~ and :;nits. 
"The di::;trict courts of the Unit€<! State:; and the United State::; courts 
of any Territory or other place ~ubject to the jurisdiction of the United 
State:; ::;hall have juri:;diction of violation:; or thi::; subchu.pter or the rules, 
regnlatious, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Teni-
torial court:;, of all :suit:s in equity to enjoin any violation of thi:s sub-
chapter or the rules, regulations, or order::; thereunder. Any criminal 
proceeding may be brought in the di:strict wherein any act or tran::;action 
con:stituting the violation occurred. Any :suit or action to enjoin any 
violation of this ~ubchapter or rules, regulation::;, or order::; thereunder, 
may be brought in any :such district or in the district wherein the de-
fendant i::> an inhabitant or tran:sact::; busines:s, and proces::; in such cases 
may be served in any di:;trict of which the defendant i:; an inhabitant or· 
transacts bu:;iness or wherever the defendant may be found. JudgmPnts 
and decree:; :;o rendered shall be :;ubject to review as provided in :-;ection:; 
225 aud 347 of Title 28, and section 7, a:s ameuded, of the Act entitled 
'An Act to e:;tabli:;h a court of appealtj for the Di:;trict of Columbia,' 
approved February 9, 1893. No cost:; :shall be as:;e:;:sed for or agam:;t 
the Commil:ision in any proceeding under thi:; subchapter brought by or 
againHt the Commi::;::;ion iu uny court." 
l 2 The respondent argues that the omi:;:>ion of any reference in § 214 
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a jurisdic~ 
tional provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a 
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action 
for anything beyond limited equitable reliefY 
Relying on the factors identified in Cart v. Ash, supra, the 
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that 
our inquiry iu this case cannot stop with the intent of Con~ 
gress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and 
to "actions at law" i~ without relevance becau~e juri:sdiction over such 
cases as thi:s would often exist under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general 
fedcral-que:stion juri~diction :otatute, and because there wa:; no expresl!! 
statement that the omission was intended to preclude private remedie;;. 
But the re:spondent concedes that the language of § 214 was probably 
narrowed in view of the absence from the Advisers Act of any express 
provil:lion for a private cau::;e of action for damage:;. We agree, but find 
the omis:sion inconsistent more generally with an intent on the part of 
Congress to make such a remedy available. 
18 Congress amended the Investment Ccrnpm1y Act in 1970 to create 
:J, narrowly cireumscribed right of action for damages again:;t inve:stment 
adviserl:l to registered investment companies. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. 
L. 91-547, 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. § 80a.-35 (b). While subsequent 
legi:slation can di:scloso little or nothing of the intent of Congre~1:1 in 
euacting earlier law,;, ~ee SEC v. Capital Gains Resem·ch Bureau, supra, 
375 U. S., a.t 199-200, the 1970 amendments to the companion Act is 
another clear indication that Congres::~ knew how to confer a private right 
of action when it wi~hed to do so. 
In 1975 the Commi~>~ion ~ubmittf'd a proposal to Congre~s that would 
ha.ve amended § 214 to extend jurisdiction, without regard to the umount 
in controver:sy, to "action~ at law" under the Act. See S. 2849, 94th 
Cong. , 2d Se;;l:l., § 6 (1976). The Commission was of the view that the 
amendment also would confirm the existence of a private right of uction 
to f'nforoo the Act's sub:;tantive provisions. See Hearings on S. 2849 
before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2 Ses~., 17 ; Hearings on 
H. R. 12981 and H . R. 13737 before the Subcommittee on Con~umer 
Protection and .Finance of the Hou:;e Committee on Interl:ltate and Foreign 
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37. The Senate Committee reported 
favorably on the provision as propo~ed by the Commi:s~ion, but the bill 
relict not come to a vote in either House. 
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated to state 
law. We rejected the same contentions last Term in Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these 
factors standing alone justified the implication of a private 
right of action under § 17 (a.) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. We said in that case : 
"It is true that in Cort v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth 
four factors that it considered "relevant'' in determining 
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not ex-
pressly providing one. But the Court did not decide 
that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The 
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to 
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause 
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in 
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative 
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S., at 78-are ones 
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative in-
tent." - U. S. , at - , -. 
The statute in Touche Ross by its terms neither granted 
private rights to the members of any identifiablP class, nor 
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, supra, at - . In those circumstances it was 
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available. 
Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended 
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. 
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect 
advisers' clients does not require the implicatio11 of a private 
cause of action for damages on their behalf. Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at - ; Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, supra, at - ; Securities Investor Protect'ion 
Corp. v. Barbour, supra, at 421. The dispositive question re-
mains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy. 
Having answered that question in the negative, our inquiry 
is at an end. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that there 
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 to void an investment advisers contract, 
but that the Act confers no other private causes of action, 
legal or equitable.14 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the 
case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
It ·is so ordered. 
14 Where rescission is awarded, the rescinding party ma.y of course have-
restitut.jon of the consideration given under the contract, less any value 
conferred by the other party. Restitution would not, however, include 
compensation for any diminution in the value of the rescinding party's 
investment. alleged to have resulted from the adviser's artion or inaction. 
Such relief could provide by indirection the equivalent of a private damage 
remedy that we have concluded Congress did not. confer. 
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that private rights of action under 
the 'Investment Advisers Act (Act) of 1940 are limited to 
actions for rescission of investment advisers contracts. In 
reaching this decision, the Court departs from established 
principles governing the implication of private rights of action 
by confusing the inquiry into ~he existence of a right of action 
with the question of available r~lief. By holding that dam-
ages are unavailable to victims of violations of the Act, the 
Court rejects the conclusion of every Circuit Court of Appeals 
that has considered the question. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 
568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977); Wils£?n v. First Houston Invest-
ment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978); Lewis v. Transarner-
ica Corp., 575 F. 2d 237 (CA9 1978). The Court's decision 
cannot be reconciled with our decisions recognizing implied 
private actions for damages under securities laws with sub-
stantially the same li!-nguage as the Act.1 By resurrecting 
1 The provisions of § 206 of the TnvrF<tmrnt Advisers Ac1 of 1940, 15 
U. S. C. § 80b-6, are substantially similar to § 10 (b) of the Srcurities 
Exchange Act of 19a4, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and llule lOb-5, 17 CFR 
§ 240.10b-5, both of which havP bern !wid to crPate privatE' rights of action 
for which damages may be recoverPd. Superintendent of lns·umnce v. 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971); Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stm·es, 421 U. S. 72:~, no (1975). ThP provisions of 
§ 215 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-15, are substantially similar to 
17,.;.,. ~ J)¥'yjlr 

















2 TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS 
distinctions between legal and equitable relief, the Court 
reaches a result that, as all parties to this litigation agree, can 
only be considered anomalous. 
This Court has long recognized that private rights of action 
do not require express statutory authorization. Texas & 
Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916); Tunstall v. 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 
210 (1944).2 The preferred approach for determi11ing whether 
a private right of action should be implied from a federal 
statute was outlined in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, - U. S. -- (1979). 
Four factors were thought relevant; 9 and although subsequent 
other provisions in the Secui'ities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78cc (b). 
2 Rigsby marked the first time this Court implied a private right of 
action. There the Court recognized that implied rights of action were not 
novel nnd had been a feature of the not infrequent common law. 1'exas & 
Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 lT. S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (citing Couch v. Steel, 
118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q. B. 1854)) . See Canrwn v. Unive1·sity of 
Chicago,- U.S.-,-, n. 10. 
8 "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,' 'l'exas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 3!} 
(1916) (emphasis supplird)-that is, does thr statutr create a federal 
right in favor of the plaiutiff? Second, is thrrc any indication of legisla-
tive intent, rxplicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one'? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn'n 
of Raili'Oad Passengers. 414 U.S. 453, 458, 4()0 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, 
is it consistent with the underlying purpose~ of the legislative scheme to 
imply such a rrmedy for thE' plaintiff? See, e. g., Arntmk, supra; Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975); 
Calhoon v. Harvey, 879 U. S. 1:34 (1964) . And finally, is the cau~e of 
action one traditionally relegated lo state law. in an urea basically the 
concern of the States, so that it would br inappropriate to infer a cause of 
action based solely on fedrral law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 
647, (152 (19()3) ; cf. J. f. Case Co. v. Bomk. :177 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); 
Biveus v. Six Unknown Jt'ederai Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395-
'77-1645-DISSENT 
'I'fiANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS ... o} 
decisions have indicated that the implication of a private right 
of action "is limited solely to determining whether Congress 
intended to create the private right of action," Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, - U. S. --, ( 1979), these four factors are 
"the criteria through which this intent could be discerned." 
Davis v. Passman, -- U. S. -, - (1979). Proper appli~ 
cation of the factors outlined in Cort clearly indicates that 
§ 206 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-6, creates a private right 
of action. 
II 
In determining whether respondent can assert a private 
right of action under the Act, "the threshold question under 
Cart is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit. of a 
special class of which the plaintiff is a member." Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, supm, at-. The instant action was 
brought by respondent as both a derivative action on behalf 
of Mortgage Trust of America and a class action on behalf 
of Mortgage Trust's shareholders. Respondent alleged that 
Mortgage Trust had retained Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visers, Inc. (TAMA) as its investment adviser and that 
violations of the Act by TAMA had injured the client cor-
poration. Thus the question under Cort is whether the Act 
was enacted for the special benefit of clients of investment 
aqvisers. 
The Court concedes that the language and legislative his-
tory of § 206 leave no doubt that it was "intended to benefit 
the clients of investment advisers," ante, at -, as we have 
previously r~cognized. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bu-
reau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-192 (1963); Santa F'e Industries, 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 471, n. 11 (1977).4 Because 
(1971); icl., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in .Juclgmrnt)." Cm·t v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 7R (1975) . 
·1 Tlw statu tor~· languagr elra rl~· indicates that thr intrnd<>cl brnrfieinrir~ 
of the Act arc t hr rlirnt,.; of invr~tm!'lll ndvi,.;<>r~'<. Sretion 206 makrs it 
unlawf~1l for any inYe~tmcnl nclviser '' (1) to <>tnploy any clcviec, sehcmc, 
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respondent's claims were brought on behalf of a member of 
the class the Act was designed to benefit, i. e., the clients of 
investment advisers, the first prong 0f the Cart test is satisfied 
in this case. 
III 
The second inquiry under the Cart approach is whether there 
is evidence of an express or implicit legislative intent to negate 
the claimed private rights of action. As the Court noted in 
Cannon: 
"the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly 
create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally 
silent or ambiguous on the question. Therefore, in situa-
tions such as the present one 'in which it is clear that 
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it 
is not necessary to show an intention to create a private 
cause of action, although an· explicit purpose to deny 
such cause of action would be controlling.' Cart, supra, 
422 U. S .. at 82 (emphasis in original)." Cannon v .. 
University of Chicago, supra, at--. 
I find 110 such intent to foreclose private actions. Indeed, 
the statutory language evinces an intent to create such ac-
tions.~ In § 215 (b) of the Act Congress provided that con-
or artifice to defraud any clirnt or prospectivr client; (2) to engage in 
any transaction, practice, or cour::>e of busine:ss which oprrates as a ·fraud 
or deceit upon any clirnt or prospective client" ; and (3) to engilge in 
certain transactions with "a client" or ' 'for the account of such client," 
without making certain written disclosures "to such client" and "obtaining 
the consent of the client to such transaction." Statements in the House 
and Senate committee reports that accompanied the onginal legi:slation 
reinforce the conclusion that the Act wa::> designed to protect investors 
against fraudulent practices by investment advisers. See, e. g., H. R. 
Rep . No. 2639, 76th Co11g., 3d Sess. , 28 (1940) ; S. Rep . No. 1775, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sei:i:s., 21 ( 1940) . 
~Abo, as the Court recognizei:i, the legislative hh;tory of the Act is 
"entirely silent" on the question of private rights of action ; it neither · 
·explicitly nor implicitly indicate:> that Congre:ss intended to deny private 
77-1645-DISSENT 
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS 5 
tracts made in violation of any provision of the Act "shall be 
void." As the Court recognizes, such a. provision clearly con-
templates the existence of private rights under the Act. 
Similar provisions in the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S. C. 
§ 80a-46 (b), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78cc (b),· and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 
U.S. C. § 79z (b), have been recognized as reflecting an intent 
to create private rights of action to redress violations of sub-
stantive provisions of those acts. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. 
Supp. 207, 225-228 (SDNY), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415 (CA2 1961); 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (ED 
Pa. 1946); F·ischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 
787, n. 4 (CA2 1951); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 735 (1975); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 
F. 2d 422, 426-427 (CA2 1944). 
The Court's conclusion that § 215, but not § 206, creates an 
implied private right of action ignores the relationship of § 215 
to the substantiYe provisions of the Act contained in § 206. 
Like the jurisdictional provisions of a statute, § 215 "creates 
no cause of action of its own force and effect; it impoEes no 
liabilities." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at - -. 
Section 215 merely specifies one consequence of a violation of 
the substantive prohibitions of § 206. The practic11l necessity 
of a private action to enforce 'this particular consequence of a 
§ 206 violation suggests that Congress contemplated the use 
of private actions to redress violations of § 206. It also indi-
caks that Congress did not intend the powers given to the 
SEC to be the exclusive means for enforcement of the Act. 6 
· damagr actions to clients victimized by their investment advisers. Every 
court that has ron~idered thr question has co~e to this conclusion. 
6 The Court concludes that brcaw;e the Act expressly provides for SEC 
enforcement proceeclingl', Congre~s mu~t not have intended to create 
private rights of action. This application of the oft-criticized maxim 
expressio uniu,s est alterius ignore~' our rejrrtion of it in Co'rt v. Ash,. 
422 U.S. 66, 82-83, n. 14 (1975), in the absence of specific support in the 
legislati,·e qistory for the proposition that express statutory remedies are 
-~ 
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The Court's holding that private litigants are restricted to 
actions for contract rescission confuses the question whether a 
cause of action exists with the question of the nature of relief 
available in such an action. Last Term in Davis v. Passrnan, 
-U.S.-,-, we recognized that "the question of whether 
a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and 
prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be 
entitled to receive." Once it is recognized that a statute 
creates an implied right of action, courts have wide discretion 
I 
in fashioning available relief. Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The existence of a 
statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and 
appropriate remedies."). As the Court stated in Bell v. Hood, 
327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946), "where legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to 
sue for such invasion, federal court may use any ava.ilable 
remedy to make good the wrong done." Thus, 'in the absence 
of any contrary indication by Congress, courts may provide 
private litigants exercising implied rights of action whatever 
relief is consistent with the congressional purpose. J. I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 ( 1964); Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U .. S. 412, 424 (1975); cf. 
11exas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, supra, at 39. The very deci-
sions cited by the Court to support implication of an equitable 
right of action from contract voidance provisions of a statute, 
indicate that the relief available in such an action need not b~ 
·restricted to ~quitable relief. Deckert v. Independence Shares 
Corp., 311 U. S. 282, 287-288 (1940); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388 (1970) ("Monetary relief will, of 
course, also be a possibility."); Kardon v. National Gypsurn 
Co., supra, at 514 ("Such suits would include not only actions 
to be exclu;,;ive. Moreover, the Court ignore;,; the fact that the enforce-
ment J)Owers given the SEC under the Inve;,;tment Advi:;ers Act are vir-
tually idPntical to thot;e embodied in other securitie:; act:; under which 
implied rights of action have been recognized. Abrahamson v. Fleschner"' 
568 F. -2d 862, 874, n . '19 (CA2 1977) .. 
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for rescission but also for money damages."). As the Court 
recognized in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 
399 0946), "where, as here, the equitable jurisdiction of the 
court has properly been invoked for injunctive purposes, the 
court has the power to decide all relevant matters in dispute 
and to award complete relief even though the decree includes 
that which might be conferred by a court of law." Thus if' 
a private right of action exists under the Act, the relief avail-
able to private litigants may include f:\>H award of damages. 
The Court concludes that the omission of the words "actions 
at law" from the jurisdictional provisions of § 214 of the Act 
and the failure of the Act to expressly authorize any private 
actions for damages reflect congressional intent to deny private 
actions for damages. Section 214 provides that federal dis-
trict courts "shall have jurisdiction of violations of [the Act]" 
and "of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of" the Act. 
15 U. S. C. § 80b-14. Although other federal securities acts· 
have provisions expressly granting federal court jurisdiction 
over "actions at law," the significance of this omission is 
delphic · at best. While a previous draft of the bill that be-· 
came the Investment Advisers Act incorporated by reference 
the jurisdictiqnal provisions of the Investment Company Act 
and the Public Utility Holding Company Act. there is no· 
indication in the legislativ!:) history as to why this draft was · 
replaced with the language that became§ 214.7 The only refer-
ence to the jurisdictional provisions of the Act is the state-
ment in the House committee report that §§ 208-2.21 "contain 
provisions comparable to those in [the Act]." H. R. Rep. 
No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 30 ( 1940). As the Second Cir-
cuit concluded in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra, at 875: 
7 Petitioner~' suggestion that thi;; change may have been the produet o{ 
industry p,essure is at odds with the legislative history. Indu~try objec-
tions to the original draft of the legi~latiun focused on matters unrelated 
to the .iurisdirtioral provisions of the bill. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R 
llep. No. 10065 before a Snbcommit1Pe of thP House Committe!' on IntPr-
:state and. Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., :3d Se:,;s., 9.2 ( 1940) . 
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"There is not a shred of evidence ir1 the legislative history of 
the Advisers Act to support the assertion that Congress inteu-
tionally omited the reference to 'actions at law' in order to 
preclude private actions by investors." See Wilson v. First 
Houston Investment Corp., supra, a.t 1242. The Court recog-
nizes that the more plausible explanation for the failure of 
§ 214 exJ~ressly to include a reference to actions at law is that, 
unlike other federal securities acts, the Act did not include 
other provisions expressly authorizing private civil actions for 
damages. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra, at 874; Bolger 
v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 
260, 264-265 (SDNY 1974). But as our cases indicate this 
silence of the Act is not an automatic bar to private actions.8 
The fundamental problem with the Court's focus on § 214 is 
that it attempts to discern congressional intent to deny a 
priva.te cause of action from a jurisdictional, rather than a sub-
stantive, provision of the Act. Because § 214 is only a juris-
dictional provision, "[i]t creates no cause of action of its own 
force and effect; it imposes no liabilities." Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington , supra, at -. Since the source of implied 
rights of action must be found "in the substantive provisions 
of [the Act] which they seek to enforce, not in the j urisdic-
tional provision." ibid., § 214's failure to refer to "actions at 
law" does not indicate that private actions for damages are 
unavailable under the Investment Advisers Act. The subject-
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over respondent's 
8 Congressional failure to make expresi:i provision for private actions for 
damage::: is not surprising in light of Congress' traditional reliance on the 
court ::; to determine whether private rights of action should be implied and· 
to award appropriat e relief. See Cannon v. University of Chicago. supra, 
at - (H~.<:HN<~U II:\'1' , J., concurring) . Although recent decisions of the· 
Court have contained admonih9n::; for Congres:; to legislate with greater 
specificity in the future, ·id ., nt ..,...... 
(HEHNQUIS'l' , J. , concurring) and - (PowELL, J., dissenting) ; Touche· 
Ross & Co . v. Redington, supra, at - , Congress cannot be faulted for· 
(ailin~ tQ ~111t.iciJ~ate the;;e admonitions when the Act was enacted in 1940. 
.. 
77-1645-DISSENT 
'l'HAN"SAMEIUCA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS 9 
action is unquestioned, regardless of how § 214 is interpreted, 
·because jurisdiction is provided by the "arising under" clause 
of 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Cf. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra, 
at 880, n. 5 (Gurfein, J .. dissenting). Where federal courts 
have jurisdictiou over actions to redress violations of federal 
statutory rights, relief canuot not be denied simply because 
Congress did not expressly provide for independent jurisdic-
tion under the statute creating the federal rights.0 
9 If Congres;; provided no indirat ion oJ any intent to deny private rights 
of action when § 214 wa~ eunct<•d, the subsequent failure of Congre::;s to 
amend § 214 likewi::;e offers none. The 1960 amendment::; to the Invest-
·meut Adviser~ Act expanded 1 he scope of § 206 and ::;treugthened the 
authorit~· of thr SEC. Pub. L. N'o. 86--750 (1960). The::;e amendments 
were not addrrs::;ed to the privatf' right of action que::;tion, nor is there any 
indication that Congre;;;s con~>iderecl the question when the amendments 
·were pas;;ed. Moreovrr, a;; the Court has noted 111 reviewing. the legis-
lative hi~tor~· of the Inve:shnent Advisers Act on a prior occasion: "the 
intent of Congress mu:st be culled from the evrnt::; surrounding the pas-
sage of thr 1940 legislation. 'LO]J}inions attributed to a Congre::;::; twenty 
year~ after thr event cannot be con::;idered evidence of the intent of the 
Congres;; of 1940.'" SEC v. Capital Gains ReseaTch BuTeau, inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 199-200 (1963) . 
ThiR admonition applies with equal force with re::;pect to the 1970 
amendment~ to the A('t. Although the 1970 amendments were part of 
legi;:;lation that created a new private right of action under the Investment 
Company Act, "it would be odd to infer from Congre::;s' actions concerning 
the newly crrated provisions of [a companion act] any intrntion regarding· 
the enforc<•mPnt of a long-exi::;ting statute." CoTt v. Ash, s·upra, 422 U. S., 
at 83, n . H . Moreover, the committee reports accompanymg the 1970 
amendments rlearly indicatt'd that the provision of express right::; of Hction 
WH::i llot intended to affect the availability of implied right::; of action else-
wherr. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1:382, 91::;1 Cong. , 2d Ses::;., 38 (1970); S. Rep. 
No. 91-184, 91st Cong., hit Srs~., 16 (1969) . 
Tlw failure of Congre~:s clunug its 1976 and 1977 ::;c:ssion::; to adopt an 
SEC propo::;a] to add thP word:s "actions at law" to § 214 of the Act abo 
dors not. foreclo::;e a privatr enforeem<'nt. The propo::;a], which wa::; favor-· 
ably reported on by a Senatr committe<', S . Rep. No. 94-910, 94th Cong., 
2cl Se:;~. (H.J7G), wa" intended only to coufirm the exbtence of an implied 
right of action aud not to create one. Lewis v. 'l'ransarnenca Corp., supm, 
~_~, 2S8, \l. I , Tfw faiht.rc of Congre:s::; to enact legi,.;lation ts not alway:'i a. 
'17-1645-DISSENT 
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IV 
The third portion of the Cart standard reqmre:s eunsiJera-
tiOJl of the compatibility of a private right of action with the 
legislativP schemf'.10 While a private remedy will not be im-
plied to thC' frustration of the legislativf' purpose. ""·hen that 
remedy is necessary or at least helpful to tlw accom plish11wn t 
of the sta.tutory purpose. the Court is decidedly reeeptivr to its 
implication under the statute." Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, supra, at-. 
'The purposC's of tlw Act have been reviewed Pxtensively by 
the Court in SEC v. Crtpital Gains Research Bw·eau, Inc., 
supra. A mPticulous review of the legislative history con-
vinced thP Court that tlw purpose of the Act was "to prevent 
fraudulPrlt pmcticPs by investment advisers." ld., at 195. 
The Court concluded that "Congress intended the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legis-
lation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds.' not tech-
nically and restrictively, but flpxibly to pffectuatc its remedial 
purposPs." ld., at 195 (footnote omitted). 
Implication of a private right of action for damages un-
quPstionably would be not only consistent with the legislative 
goal of preventing fraudulent practices by investment advisers, 
but also essential to its achiPvement. While the Act empowers 
the SEC to takf' action to seek equitable relief to prevent 
offending investment advisers from engaging in future viola-
t•cliabl(' Jl;llirl<' to legi~Iat ivr inlrnt. 7?1'rl Lwu Bmadcasting Co. v. FCC, !305 
U. R. :~m. :182, n. 1l (Hl60); Fooarty v. United Statl's, 340 ll. S. R, 13-14 
(1950) . It iH a totall.v inadPquate guidr whrn, as brr<', Cougrr~~ ma~· have 
dcemrd t IH' propo~cd Jegi~lation unnercs ·ary, givrn the adf'(fU:lry of PXI:>l-
ing l<·~i~l:ttiou to ~uppor1 an implied right of action. 
10 The Court Ignores thr third and fomt h prong8 of tlw Cort te~[ . on the 
ground that tiH'." wrr<' 1gnorrd iu Touche Ross & Co. v. Hedington, -
U. R. -. HowrvN, i11 '!'our· he Russ I he Court Jound II unnt<·e:;:;Hry to 
con,.;ider thP~C' fador~ onl~· brrau::<<' the olhPr portion~ of tlw Curt ::<landard 
could nol b<' ~uti~fird. By routra~t. the Court lwrc ('011('ludc~ that at 
lcu~L lhc first part of the Co1't test is i'ltti~fied 
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tions,11 in the absence of a private right of action for damages, 
victimized clients have little hope of obtaining redress for their 
IDJUries. Like the statute in Cannon, the Act does not assure 
that the members of the class it benefits are able "to activate 
and participate in the administrative process contemplated by 
the statut~." Cannon v. U11iversity of Chicago, supra, l:tt -, 
n. 41. Moreover, the SEC c~,nclidly admits that, given the 
tremendous growth of the investme11t advisory industry, the 
magnitude of the enforcement problem exceeds the Commis-
sion's limited examination 1 apd enforcement ca.pabilities.12 
The Commission maintains that private litigation therefore is 
a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement activity. Ul1der 
the circumstances of this case, this position seems UI'lassail-
able. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, at 432; Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, supra, at-. 
v 
The fin~l consideration under the Cort analysis is whether 
the subject matter of the cause of action has been so traui-
tion~tllY relegated to state law as to make it imwpropriate to 
infer a federal cause of action. Regulation of the activities of 
investment advisers has not been a tra<litional state concern. 
J.l Sre, e. (f .. § 209 (P) of thr Act, 15 U . S. C. § 80b-9 (t:>) (authorizing 
ihe SEC to E<eek injunctive relief against violation~ of the Act) : § 203 (c), 
15 U. S. C. § 20b-3 (e) (empowering the SEC to rf'voke the registratwn 
of investmf'nL adviRf'rR) . 
1 2 A~ of Decrmb<>r 31, 19711, a total of 5,385 inwshneni advisers were 
registered with thr s~c. The Commi:s:sion f'i'itimatt'S that for the fi:scal 
year emhng Octobrr :30, 1980. more than $200 billion in assPt:s will be . 
under advisement h~· rf'gi~tered invt'Stmrui advi~rrs. (SEC Brief, at 
32-33). In lUi'i, tht' SEC wa~ able to conduct only 459 in~pPction:s of 
im'('stment advi~er~. SEC, 43d Annual Report 2:34 (1979) . As tlw Coqrt 
recognized in Cannon. in mnny car:H'~' the enforcerrlE'nt agency · may be 
unable to invr~iigate meritorion~ private complnintH, and rven when the 
few invc~tigation,; do uncover vwlation,., tl1r privatf' v1ctim:s of tlw viol'a· 
tions need lwt be included in the relief. Cannon v. University of ,Chicago, 
sttpra, at -, n, 41. 
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During the Senate h~arings preceding enactment of the Act, 
Congress was informed that only six States had enacted legis-
latiOI'l to regulate investment advisers. Hearings on S. 3580 
before a Subcommittee of the Sen~tte Committee on Banking 
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 996-10017 (1940). Most 
of the state statutes subsequeptly enacted have been pat-
terned after the federal legislation. See Note, Private Causes 
'of Action Under Section 206 of the Investmeut Advisers Act, 
74 Mich. L. Rev. 308,' 324 (1975). 
Althou~h some practices proscribed by the Act undoubtedly 
would have been actionable in common-law actions for fraud, 
"Congress iutended the Investment Advisers Act to establish 
federal fiducit~-ry standards for investment advisers." Sa:nta 
Fe Indu~tries, Inc. v. Green, mpra, at 471, n. 11; SEC v. 
Capital Gains 'f?,esearch Bureau, supra, at 191-192. While 
state law may be applied to parties subject to the Act, "as 
long as private causes of action are available in federal courts 
for violations of the federal statutes, [the] enforcement prob-
lem is obviated." Burks v. Lasker, supra,- U. A.-,-, 
n. 6 (1979) , 
VI 
Each qf the Cort factors point toward implication of a pri-
vate cau e of action +n favor of clients defrauded by invest-
ment advisers in violation of the Act. The Act was enacted 
for the special benefit of clients of investment advisers and 
there is no indication of any legislative intent to deny such a 
cause of ftCtion, which would be consistent with the legisl~:~-tive 
scherne governing an area not traditionally relegated to state 
law. Under these circumstances an implied private right of 
action for damages should be recognized. 
' ) 
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No. 77-1645, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA), et 
al., v. Harry Lewis 
~Mr. Justice Powell / concurring. 
As I view the Court's opinion to be compatible with my 
dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, U.S. at 
(ante lat 8, 9), I join the Court's opinion. 
\ 
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As [ view the Court 's opinion to be compatible with rny 
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.:§ttprmtt Qfourl of tqt 'J!t.ttittb .;§tattg 
'JMagqmgton, l9. <!f. 20,?'t~· 
October 6, 1979 
Re: 77-1645 - Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
My vote is to reverse. I would not go so far as to 
say we will never find a private right of action implicit 
in a statute, but I think the time has come that in this 
area of legislation Congress should take the 
responsibility for affirmative clarification. 
Regards, 
~') 





SUPREME COURT 'OF 'fHE UNITED STATES 
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. 
(TAMA) ET AL. v. HARRY LEWIS 
ON PETI'l'ION FOH WRIT Of C~R'l;IORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
FIRST HOUSTON INVESTMENT CORP. ET AL. v. 
JOHN M. WILSON 
QN PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAlU TO TfiE UNITED STATES 
CQU~T OF APPEALS J!'OH ',I'JiE J!'IFTH CIHCUIT 
Ot> . 77-1645 aml 77-1717. Decided October-, 1978 
MR. JusTICE PO'fELL, dissenting. 
These cases present the question whether § 206 of the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Act), 15 U.S. C.§ 80b-6, 
gives customers asserting fraud a private cause of action 
against an investment compal1y 1111d its adviser. As it did last 
Term in Fleschner v. Abrahamson,- U. S. -, 46 U. S. L. W. 
3710 (May 15, 1978), the Court today declines a,n opportunity 
to decide this question . The Act contains no provision author-
izing private suits. and whether authority to sue may be 
inferred has caused sharp disagreement withi11 the courts of 
appeals. , 
The respondeut in No. 77-1645 is a shareholder of the 
Mortgage Trust ~-AmBrica (MTA), a real es~ate invest-
ment tru~t under l. R. C. §~ 856-858. He brought suit 
against MTA and various companies and individuals associ-
ated with MTA (the petitiouers), alleging that the petitioners 
had participated in a fraud11lent scheme under which .MTA 
was organized and opera_!!tcl toJb.,t.!!~age ..£! !!s adviser and 
parent ~ to the detriment of MTA's i11vestors. Each qf the 
cumplai11t's six c~tuses of action purported to be based on § 206 
of the Act, which makes it illegal for a11 mvestment adviser 
covered by the Act to "engage in ai~Y transaction, pnitctice, ' or 
course of busjness which operates as a fraud or deceit upon 
' . 
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any client or prospectiw client.'' Jurisdiction was invoked 
under ~ 214 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 80b-14. which gives 
federal c~rts jurisdiction "of violations of this subchapter or 
the rules, regula,tions. or orders thereu11der, and ... of all suits 
in equity to enjoin any violation of this s4bchapter .... " 
The District Court for the ~orttwrn District of California 
dismissed the respondent's suit. ruling that ~ 206 of the Act 
does not afford investors such as the respondent a private 
cause of action against an investment company. The Court 
of Appeals for the Kinth Circuit reversed, stating simply that 
it had reviewed the question and agreed with the Second and 
Fifth Circuits that ~ 206 gives rise to a privatP cause of actio11. 
See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 ( 1977). cert. 
demed, - U. S. - . 46 U. S. L. W. 3710 (May 15. 1978); 
Wilson \', Fir8t Housto11 Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 
(CA5 1978), cert. demed this day. No. 77-1717. One judge 
dissented from the court's decision. stating that he also had 
revwwed the questwn and sided with the dissent in 
A braham son. 
The respondent in ~o. 77-1717 is an i11dividual who en-
trusted his stock portfolio. worth $104.358. to the m~nt 
of ~·st Houston Invrstment Company and 
three of Jts employees). Within 18 months. First Houston 
had transformed the portfolio through ~)tr l!..,sivh tradinf into 
a list of stocks worth slightly over $5,000. T e respondent 
brought suit against the petitioners asserting, inter alia, that 
they had violated ~ 206 of thP Act by misrepresenting First 
Houston 's method of operations. 
The District Court for the Western District of Texas 
dismissed the respo11dent's claim undN ~ 206. but the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. After examining the 
requirements this Court has set down for implying private 
causes of action, see Ptper v. Chris-Craft Industr-ies, Inc., 43G 
F . ~. 1 (1977). the court cone] uded tha.t ~ 206 gives rise to a 
private actiOJI for damagrs. In so ruling. the court reliecf 
heavily upo11 the ~econd Circuit's opinioiJ ill Abrahamson v. 
l!'l'eSJ:.·/jn~r One member. OJf the pa.nel Uiss<et'lted from the Fifth 
''~~-~--~ .---, "' 
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Circuit's ruling, arguing th~:~.t the ·12urpose of the Act was to 
allow Congress to gather the information necessary for it to 
decide whether it should legislate further concerning abuses of 
i1westment companies. 'J'~1Us, the dissent concluded that ~ 206 
was not meant to provide a private cause of action for individ~ 
ual investors. 
Recent decisions of this Court have reltffirmed that private 
causes of actiqn will be inferred from seclirities statutes only 
if such an inferepce is consistent with the language and history 
of the statute a.n,d is nepessary to avoid subversion of Congress' 
purpose in passing the statute. See, e. g., Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc., ' 430 U. S. 1 (1977). If courts are to avo'id 
stepping beyond the legislative boundaries set by Congress, 
they must take care in extending damage liability under 
statutes that do not create such liability explicitly. In the 
words of Justice Frankfurter, "[a] t best this is sqbtle business, 
calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere 
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of 
legislation becomes legislation itself." Palmer v. Massachu-
setts, 308 U. S. 79, 83 (1939). This danger i~ particqlarly 
acqte with respect to § 206 of the Act, as Congress has 
declined to proyide for rrivate dl).mage actionu lthough it 
several times l'J.S reviewed a.n o erwise strengthened the 
e~h~'lis'iiis okf the Acl 'See tlie~pinion of J ;;-dge 
Gurfein, concurrmg an lSSenting in Abrahdmson v. Fleschner, 
568 F. 2d 862, 883-884 (CA2 1977), an opinion that I find 
quite persuasive. 
Moreover, the j~isdictio9al. grant of the Act differs from 
that of other securities acts in its reference only to "suits in 
equity" ; other acts include as well a grant of jurisdiction 
extending to "actions at law brought to enforce any liability 
or duty created [under the 4,ct]." Compare § 214 of the Act 
with § 44 of the Investment Compauy Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§' 80a-43. 
Three Courts of Appeals now have considered whether ~ 206 
of the Act creates a private action for damages against invest-
ment companies. In each case. the panel has been sharply 
4 T'ItANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. v. LEWIS 
divided in its resolution of the question, individual members 
having drawn different inferences from the hwguage and legis-
lative history of the Act. furthermore, the liability of invest-
ment companies to private damage suits under the Act is a 
matter of considerable importance both to the companies and 
to the public with whom they deal. 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-1645, TAMA v. Lewis 
I have reviewed Mr. Justice Stewart's circulated 
opinion in this case. In its present form, the opinion contains 
one ambi~y. On <€§:e ~ it notes that plaintiffs seek 
L[/rescission of the contract, restitution of fees~n accounting 
of illegal profits, and damages. 0~ it concludes 
that section 215 allows a suit for rescission and restitution. 
On ~ it holds that there exists a limited private 
remedy to void a contract and "restore the parties to the status 
quo." I assume that the opinion would, therefore, allow a 
district court to enjoin further operation of the contract, and 
2. 
investment advisor return all fees and the 
Nevertheless, the opinion could be more 
fTT"1"--A-1A---1"-t1n s po i n t • 
Yo~ view at Conference was that no monetary relief 
should be permissible under section 215. I believe a holding --- ---that Mr. Justice Stewart's slightly different holding is 
acceptable for two reasons: ( 1) the return of fees and the 
A .tp- ------rr"'· investment properly comports with the common understanding of 
~ the term "recission" used in section 215, ( 2) fees and the 
mount of the original investmenf-:"an be computed easily and 
~ ~~~~jectively, lessening the possibility that damages may be 
~ vy- _ ~~ 
~ awarded under the guise of an equitable decree. Therefore, I 
recommend that you join Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion once it is 
clarified. 
Mr. Justice Sewart's analysis of the damages issue is 
solid. You may wish to add a short concurrence joining his 
opinion and expressing the view that the outcome in this case is 
consistent with your opinion in Cannon v~ University of Chicago. 
.To: The Chief ut.r. 1-. 
Mr Justice ennun 
K.r. Just ice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
X Mr. Justice PoHcll 
Mr. Justice R~=>hnquist 
Mr. Justice St .. wens 
From: Mr. Just ice Stewar t 
Circulated : 2 9 OCT 19 9 
(/. 
Recirculated: ___________ __ 
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peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
[October -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. ~ 80b-1 
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress had 
found to exist in the i11vestmeut advisers industry. The 
question in this case is whether that Act creates a private 
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of persons 
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it. 
The respondent, a shareholder of petiti011er Mortgage Trust 
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district 
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a 
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as 
defeHdants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the 
Trust's in vestment adviser, Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA, 
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Cor-
poration (Transamf'rica), all of which are petitioners in this 
case.1 
1 Hrrrinaftrr "the petitioner~" rdt•rs to the prtitionrrs other than the 
Trust. The Tru~t i~ a real r~tate inv<:'~:<tment tru~t within tlw meaning of 
§§ R5G-R58 of the Internal Hrvrnue Code. TA:MA, in additioJl to advi~­
ing the Trust, mt{frjg<:'d it,~ day-to-clay oprrationR. Tran~america i;:: the 
spon:;or of the Tru:;t and til(' parent of Land Capital. Land Capital is 
the parenL of TAl\IA, through a ~ubHidiary, and sold the Trust it~ initla[ 
' . 
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The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in 
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty 
of various frauds ancl breaches of fiduciary duty. The com-
plaint set out three causes of action, each said to aris<' under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.2 The first alleged that 
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was 
unlawful because TAMA and Transamcrica were not regis-
tered under the Act and because the contract had provided 
for grossly excessive compensation. The second alleged that 
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by 
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land 
Capital. The third alleged that the petitioners had misap-
propriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit 
of othrr con~nies affiliated with Transamerica. The com-
plaint soughif%junctiv~ief to restrain further performance 
of the advisory contrae~scission of the contrasb-.restitution] ~~ . 
of fees and other considerations paid by the Tr~n account- .,v.~\ 
ing of illegal profits. and a11 award of damages. 
The trial court rule(l that the Investment Advisers Act con-
fers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the 
eomplaint.a The C'ourt of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237, 
holding that "implication of a private right of action for· 
injunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plain-
tiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in euacting 
the legislation." ld., at 239. 1 We granted certiorari to con-
portfolio of inve~tmrntf'. Se,·rml of the individual tru:ster,.: were at the 
time of suit affiliated witl1 TAMA, Transameriea, or other sub~:>idiarie:s of 
Tran;,amc:>rira. 
2 Each cause of action wa~ Htatrd as a derivative ~:>hareholder's claim 
:mel restated as a sha rrholclers class claim. 
3 The pc:>rtinrnt ordrr" of the Di:strict Court are unrt>portt>cl. 
1 The Di~trict Court waH of the view thnt it was without subjeet-matter 
]uri:sdirtion of the rP;;pondrnt'H suit. The Court of Appral~ rt>character-
izPcl the Di~:<trict Comt's order tli:-;mi~sing the ~uit a,; properly ba>'\'d upou· 
thr rrspondPnt's failure to ::;tatP a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
Frd, Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (6), noting that the re:;pondeut':; suit was; 
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sider the importaut federal question presented. - U. S.-
( 1978). 
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides 
for a private causP of action. The ouly provision of the Act 
that authorit~es a11y suits to enforce the duties or obligations 
created by it is § 209, which permits the i:iecurities Excha.nge 
Commission (Con~issi;;;) to bring suit in a federal district 
courtta enjoiu violations of the Act or the rules promulgated 
under it." The argument is made, however, that the clients 
HpJmrentl~· within the Dititrict Court'~ g('llt'ral fedt'ral-que:;tion jurisdic-
tion uudrr 28 U.S. C.§ 1:3;H . 575 F. 2d, at 2;39, n. 2. 
The Court. of ApJlrab in thi:; ea.'e followed the Court~ of Appeal::; for the 
F1fth and Second Circuit~, which al:;o have held that private' cau~e~ of 
actiou may he maintaiuC'd undPr the Act. St'e Wilwn v. P.irst Houston 
!twest'lfl ent Corp., 566 F . 2d 1235 (CA5 1971:1) ; Abrahamson v. Fil'sclm el', 
568 F . 2d Rfi2 (CA2 1977) . 
" Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provich•:; in pnrt n::; followti : 
"(e) WhrnC'vcr it ;:hall appear to the Commiti~ion that auy prrtion 
has Pngaged, i::: rugagPcl, or i~ about to rngagr in auy act or practice con-
stituting a violation of any provi;;ion of thi ~ "ubchapter, or of au~· rule, 
rq?;ulatiou, or ordrr hereunder, or that any per~on has ai(h•d , abt•tled, 
coun~eled, commanded, indu!'ed, or proem·l•d, i::; aiding, ab<'lting, (·ounticl-
in~ , commandin~-t. inducing, or procming, or is about to aid , a bPI, counsel, 
command, imlure , or Jll'Ol'tll'(' i<llth a violaliou, it ma~' in il~ cli~cretion 
bring an adion .in the JlrOp<'r cli~trid !'ourt of the Unih·cl States, or the 
projwr CnitPd Slal<'s court of any Tl'rritory or other plarr subject to the 
juri~diction of the Fnited States, lo enjoin ,;ueh acts or practices and to 
enforrr romplianrC' with this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order 
hcrt'tmcler. Upon ~~ showin!!; that ,.;uch Jlf•r,.;on has engaged, is engaged, or 
i::; about. to en!!;uge in an~· such act or praetiN', or in aiding, abetting, coun-
seling , rommandiug, indueing, or pro(·uring any ::;uch act or practice. a per-
llWIH' llt or t!'mporary iujunetion or dec ree or re:; training order shall be 
grnnlC'd without. bond . The Connui$~iou ma~' tran~mit such evidence as 
may be availalliP (·onct•ming any Yiolation of thr provision~ of thiti sub-
chaptrr, or of any rule, regulation , or ordPr lh(•rP1lllclt'r, lo the Attorney 
General, who, iu hi::; di,.;erction, may inslilule the appropriate criminal 
proccding::; under thi~ ,ub!'IH\]llt•r." 
The languagl' in § 209 (c) that authorizrs the Commis,;ion to obtain an 
injunction against JWI'i<on:; "aidi n~. ahettiug, ... or procuring'' violation,; 
of the Act wa ::; addc·d lo the ;;talutc in 1950. 74 Stat. 8137 
' . 
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the 
Act and that courts should ~erefore imply a private cause of 
action in their favo,2- Sec Ca:mwn v. Uni~ersity of Chicag!!_, 
-U.S. -,..L-~ Vort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 6G, 78; [ 1. Case v. 
~ 377 U.S. fie. 
The question whetlwr a statute creates a cause of action, 
either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of 
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. -, -; Cannon v. University of Ch·icago, S'Upra, -
U. S., at -; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court 
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of 
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies 
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g., 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be deter-
mined is whether Congress intended to create the private 
rPmedy ass~ed, as our rpcent Clecisious have made clear. 
V'Fouche Ross & Co. Y. Redinyton, 442 U.S., at-; Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, - U. S., at-. We accept this as 
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues 
presenteu by the case before us. 
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute 
itself. Touche Ross & Vo. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at -; 
Ca11non "· University of Chicago,-- U.S., at--; Santa Fe 
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft 
I-ndus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation 
of a private right of action cau fairly be inferred from the 
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which 
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advis-
ers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ 
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or to engage in 
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates 
as a fraud or dPceit upon ally client or prospective client," 
or to engage in specified trausactioml with clients without, 
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making required disclosures.6 The second is § 215, which pro-
vides that contracts whose formation or performance would 
violate the Act "shall be void . .. as regards the rights of" 
the violator and knowing successors in interest.7 
6 Section 206, 15 U.S. C.§ SOb-6, reads a~ follow~ : 
"§ 80b-6. Prohibited tran~actions hy iuve~tmeut advisers. 
"It shall be unlawful for any inve::;tmeut advi:;er, by Ui:ie of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of inter:;tate commerce, directly or 
indirectly-
" (1) to employ any device, ~cheme, or artifice to defraud any client or 
prOi:iJWctive client; 
"(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or eour:se of business which 
operate:; as a fraud or dPeeit upon any client or prospective client; 
"(3) acting as principal for hi::> own account, knowingly to sell any 
security to or purchase any :;erurity from a client, or acting as broker for 
a person other than such clirnt, knowingly to effcet any sale or purchase 
of any security for the account of i:iUC'h client, without di:;closing to sucl1 
client in writing before the completion of such trani"action the capacity in 
which he ii:i ac·ting and obtaining the consent of the client to such trans-
action. The prohibition:; of thi::; paragraph shal not apply to any trans-
action with a. customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is 
not acting a.~ an inve::;tmeut advist•r in relation to ::;uch transaction ; 
" ( 4) to engage in auy act, practice, or cour::;e of bu~iness which is fraud-
t\lent, deceptivr, or manipulative. The Commi~::;ion shall, for the purposes 
of this paragraph ( -l) b~r rule::; and regulations define, and prescribe 
meam; rea ·omtbly designed to prevent., such acts, practices, and courses 
of bu:<ines::; a::; arc fraudulent, deerptiv(', or manipulative." 
Section 206 (4) was added to the ::;tatute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that 
time Congress also extended the provision::; of § 200 to all inve::;tment 
advi~er:;, whethrr or not ::;uch aclvi:;er::; were re<.Juired to regi::;ter under 
§ 203 of the Act. Ibid. 
7 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-15, read::; in part as follow : 
"§ 80b--15. Validity of contracts 
"(b) Every contract made in violation of any provi:;ion of this subchapter 
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which 
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relation::;hip or' prac-
tice in violation of an~· provi:.;ion of thi::; subchapter, or an~· rule, regula,-
tion, or order thereundrr, :;hall be void (1) a:; regard:; the right::; of any 
person who, in vwlation of any such provi~ion , rule , regulation, or order, 
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It is apparent that the two sections were intPndPd to bendit 
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215, 
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As WP have pre-
viously recognizt>d. ~ 206 establishes "federal fiduciary stand-
ards" to govern the conduct of iuvestment advisers. Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. R., at 471. n. 11; Burks, .. Lasker, 
- U. S. -. -, n. 10; SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Burea'u, Inc., 37.1 F. S. 180, HH-192. Indeed. the Act's legis-
lative history leaves no doubt that Congn'ss intended to 
. impose enforceabk fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No. 
2639, 76th C'ong., 3d Ress .. 28 (Hl40); S. Rep. Xo. 177.5. 7Gth 
Cong .. 3d Sess .. 21 (H)40); SEC. Report on Investment Trusts 
and Investment Compauies (Investnwnt Counsel and Iuvcst-
ment Advisory Services). H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong .. 2d 
Sess., 27-30 ( 1939). But whether Congress intended addi-
tionally that these provisious would be enforced through pri-
vate litigation is a different qurstiou. 
On this question the l~islatiw history of the Act is ~n­
tirely silentr-a state of affairs not surprising whe11 it is remem-
berrd that the Act. concededly does not explicitly provide any 
private remedies whatevet·. See Cam1011 v. Fniversity of 
Chicago, supra, - U. S .. at -. But while tlH' absence of 
anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention 
to confer any private> right of action is hardly helpful to the 
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his posi-
tion. This Court has held that the failure of Congress 
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably incon-
sistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy avail-
able. Cannon v. University of Chicayo, - U. S., at -. 
Such an i11tent rnay appear implicitly in the language or 
,;hall havr madl' or rugap:ed in tlH' perform<t11ee of any :suC'h l'Ont raC't, and 
(2) as rc•gard~ t hP right~ of 1111~· per~un who, not bPinp; a part~· to Huch 
conlraC't, :<hall ha\'C' :t<'quirPd an~· right then·under with actual knowledge 
of the faet>" by rca~un ol' which tlw making or pcrformanec of such con-
tract wa::; in violation of any such proviHwn ." 
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structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its 
enactment. 
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian~ ' 2. t r 
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief 
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215 
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of void~ 
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the 
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be 
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforce-
ment of au investment advisers contract. But the legal con-
sequences of voidness are typically not so limited. 4 person I 
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a 
court to have the contract rescinded and to obta.in restitution 
of consideration paid. See Deckert V. Independence Corp., 
311 U. S. 28f 289;-Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525; 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudeuce, 4th edition, §§ 881 and 1092. 
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable 
provision, ~ 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U. S. C. § 77cc (b). confers a "right to rescind" a contract void 
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in gen-
eral have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause 
of action for rescission or similar relief. E. g., Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512. 514 (DCED Pa. 
1946); see III Loss. Securities Regulation 1758-1759 (2d ed. 
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S. 723, 735. 
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress dew red 
in ~ 215 that certain c ontracts a;;-void, it intended that the 
customary legal incidents of v idness would follow. including 
the ava1 a 1 ity o a suit fo escission or for ~ injunction 
against continued operation of the contract, afrtt'for restitu-
tion.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was -
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain au action 
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers 
contract.0 
We view quite differently. however, the respondent's claims 
for damages and other monetaryrelief under § 206. Unlike 
§ 215, ~ 206~mpTy})roscril3es certain conduct. and does not in 
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability 
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the 
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction 
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy 
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. 
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, 
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra, 
414 U. S., at 458; Securities Protection Investment Corp. v. 
Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 419; '1'. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and 
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206. 
Fi~st. under § 217 wTIIrul violations of the Act are criminal 
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Sec-
ond, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in 
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, 
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by 
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons 
who violate the Act, including § 206. In view of these express 
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206. it is 
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to 
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University 
of Ch·icago,- U.S., at- (PowELL, J., dissenting). 
§ 215 would be rai~rd only in state court. But we dPcline to adopt 'such 
an :11101nalouH ron~truetion Without ~ome indication that Congre~s in fact 
wi~hed to remit the litigation of :1 ft>dcral right to the Htate court~. 
0 Juri~dirtion of Huch Huits would exi~t under § 214 which, though 
rcfprring in term~ only to "Huits iu ('<.juity to enjoin violation::;." would 
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c. 
:Even s ttlecJ rules of stlliutory construction ~mld yield, of 
.t:oursc, to vidt>nce of a contrary legislative intent. Securities 
Protection Investor Corp. v. Barbo·ur, 421 U. S. 412, 419; 
Amtrak, supra, 414 lT. S., at 458. But what evideuce of intent 
exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs against 
the implication of a private right of action for a monetary 
award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities 
1aws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the 
Investnwnt Company Act which was enacted as companion 
legislation, Congress expressly authorized private suits for 
damages in prescribed circumstauccs.1° For example, Con-
gress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresen ta-
tions contained in an underwriter's registration statement in 
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, aud for certain mate~ 
rially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. "Obviously, then, when Congress wished 
to provide a private damage remedy, it kuew how to do so 
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, -
U. S., at 11. Blue Ch·ip Stamps v. Manor Druy Stores, 421 
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458; 
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S., at 471. The fact 
that it euacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here 
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling 
to impose any potential monetary liability to a p~te suitor. 
See Abrahamson v. Flechsner, 508 F. 2d, a.t - (Gurfein, J., 
dissenting). 
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's 
substa11tive provisions was paralleled in the j urisclictioual sec-
10 SeP Secmities Aet of 1933, §§ 11 and 12, 15 lJ. S. C. §§ 77k and 771; 
RccuritiPR ExchangP Act or 19:34, §§ 9 (p), 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C . 
.'~ 71i (<'), 78p (b), and 78r ; Publie Utility Holding Company Act or 
19:35, §§ 16 (u) alH.l 17 (b), 15 lT. S . C. §§ 79p (a) and 79q (b); Tru::~t 
lndPnture Art of 19:39, § 3:23 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a) ; InvcRtment 
Company Act of 1\140, § 30 (f), 15 U. S. C . § HOa-29 (f) . 
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tion, ~ 214.]1 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated 
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935. which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all 
suits in equity and ad·ious at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added). 
SeeS. 3580. 76th Cong., 3d Sess .. 98 (introduced by Sen. Wag-
ner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R 8935, 76th Cong .. 3d Sess., 98 (in-
troduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the 
bill in the Senate. representatives of the iuvcstment advisers 
industry and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the 
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was 
enacted as ~ 214 first appeared in this compromise versiou of 
the bill. See Confidential Committee PriiJt, A. 3580, 76th 
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally 
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both 
omitted any references to "actions at law" or to "liability." 12 
11 Sc·ction 214, 15 U. S. r. § 80b-H, vroviue:> : 
"§ SOb-14. Jurisdiction of offen,:e" all([ l"llit:;. 
"The di,.;triet courts of the Unit<'d Statr>< and the United Statet-~ t•ourts 
of nn~· Trrritor~· or other j)lace subjPct to the jurisdic·tion of the United 
State:; :;hall have juri~didion of violatiou:< of thi" :,;ubchaptrr or the rule~, 
regulation", or orders tht·r·<·tmder, and, concurrently with State and Terri-
torial courtR, of all ::;uit,.; in equit~· to pnjoin ;my violatiou of thi:< ::;ub-
chapt('f or the rules, n•gulations, or order::; tlwretmder. An~' criminal 
11roceeding may be brought in the di,-t rict wherein any art or lran::;aetion 
ron~tituting thr violation o<·currPd . Any suit or action to enjoin ally 
violation of this ~ubchapkr or rules. regulation~, or order;.; thrreunder, 
may be brought in any Httrh di:,;tri!'t or i11 th<• district whPrPin tlw de-
fendant is an inhabitant or tran~aet,; busine:;~, nnd JH'O<'P::;,; in such ca:;c:; 
may hP served in :tn~ · district of which thP clefPndant i~ an inhabitant or 
transact:< bu::;inPSH or whPn·ver the d!'femlant may be found. .Judgments 
and dpcree::< ~o rell(]PrPd shall bt• ::;ub.i<•rt to review as provided in ;.;ections 
225 nnd :~47 of Titk• 2k. and s<•rtion 7, a:; anH:•nd<•d, of the Act entitled 
'An A('t to e:;tablish a court of appeal:; for the District of Columbia,' 
approvNl FPbnrary 9, lk9:3. Ko ('O~ts ,;hall be m;:;p~:;ecl for or again~l 
the Conuui,-,:ion iu an~· JH'O<·<·ecling under thi:; subchapter brought by or 
against the Commi::;;.;ion in any court .'' 
12 The n·~pondenL argue::; that thP omission of any reference in § 214:. 
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a j urisdic-
tional provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a 
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evideiiCe 
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action 
for anything beyond limited equitable relief. 1 3 
Relying on the factors identified ill Cort v. Ash, supra, the 
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that 
our inquiry in this case cannot stop with the intent of Con-
gress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and 
to "action:, at law" i~ without rclevanc·c Ul'rau,;c juri:,;diction over Hueh 
ra;:<'~ aR thi:-: would often Pxi~t under 28 lf. S. C. § 1:~31. the gmeral 
fedNal-qup,.:tion juri:-:diC't ion ,.:t atute, and iJl'<'aUO>l\ there wa,.; no cxprc~s 
statrmcnt that thr omi,.::;iun wn;; intendt•d to precludr private remedir::L 
But the rr::;pondent conecde:-: that thr languagl' of § 214 wa:-: probably 
narrowe<l in view of the ab:.;ent'<' from thl' Advi"er:; Ad of any r:oxpre:;:; 
pruvi:sion for a private cau:-:t• of artion for damagl'"· We agree, but find 
thP omi:;,.ion inconsi:;trnt n10I'<' generally with an intent 011 the part of 
Congres::; to makP sueh a remcd~r available. 
13 Congn•H;; amPndpd thP Inw:;tmcnt Company Al't in 1970 to create 
[1. narrowly circurmcrilwd right of action for damage~ ugain:;t investment 
nuvi::;rrs to reg:Rtered inve,;tment. companies. Act of Dee. 14, 1970, Pub. 
L. 91-5-l-7, 20, 84 Stat. 1·!2., 15 U.S. C. § HOa-35 (b). WhilP :sub~equPnt 
h·gii'lation ran disclose little or nothing of the intrnt. of Congress in 
enacting earlier law~. ~<·e SEC \'. Capital Gain~> H,esearch Bureau. supra, 
375 U. S., at 199-200, the 1970 amendnwnts to thr companion Act is 
another <"lrar indicaticn that. Cougres::; knew how to confer u private right 
of nrtion wlwn it wished to do ~o. 
In 1975 t hr Commi,;sion submit ted n propo:;al to CongrP~i:i that would 
have anwmled § 214 to extPnd juri:;dietiou, without rc•gard to the amouut 
in controvpr~~~ , to "act ions at law" under the Aet. SP<' S. 2849, 94th 
Cong .. 2d Rr;.;s., § G (1976). 'Thl' Conuui:-;;.;ion was of the view that the 
ameudmcnt abo would eonfirm the exi::;teiWl' of a privatP right of action 
to <'!If on'€ the Act '::; ~ub:-;tantiw provisions. See Hearing:; on S. 2849 
before thr SubcommittrP on SPeuritie~ of the Senate Conunittec on Bank-
mg, Hou.,ing, and ·o rba11 Affair:;, 94th Cong., 2 SPH:-i., 17; Hearings on 
H. R. 12981 and H. R. 137a7 beforl' the Subcornmittee on Con:;umpr 
Protection and Finarwc of the Hou~e Conuuittce 011 lnt<•r:;tatc and Foreign 
CommerC'r, 9-J.th Cong., 2d SPS::'. , ;~(i-37. Tlw Senate CommitteP reported· 
favorably on the provi:-:ion a:; propo~ed by lhr Conum:;,;ion, but the bill 
(ljd 110t eonw to. tt vote iu <'~ther House,_ 
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated~ state 
law. We re.ifcted thr sanw contentions last Term in Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these 
factors standing alonr .i ustified the implication of a private 
right of action under ~ 17 (a) of the Securities Excha11ge Act 
of 1934. We said in that case: 
11lt is truP that in Cort v. Ash, :,·upra, the Court set forth 
four factors that it considered "relevaBt" in determining 
whether a private remedy is implicit i11 a statute not ex-
pressly providing one. But the Court did not decide 
that each of these factors is eBtitled to equal weight. The 
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to 
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause 
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in 
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative 
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S .. at 78-are ones 
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative in• 
tent." -- U. S., at - , -. 
The statute in Touche Ross by its tenns neither granted 
private rights to the members of any identifiable class, 11or 
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, supra, at -. In those circumstances it was 
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available. 
Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended 
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited. 
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect 
advisers' clients does not requirr the implication of a private 
cause of action for damages 011 their behalf. 'J'ouche Ross & 
Co. v. Redingto11, supra, 4421T. S .. at-; Cannon v. Univer-
s·ity of Chicago, supra, at - ; Securities Investor Protection 
Corp. v. Barbour, S'Upra, at 421. The dispositive question re- ·1 
mains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy. 
Having a11swered that question in the negative, our inquiry 
is at an end. 
For the reasons staU>d in this opinion, we hold that there· -
77-1645-0PINIO~ 
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940 to void au investment advisers contract 
and restore the parties to the status quo, but that the Act 
confprs no other pri \'ate causes of action, legal or equitable. 
Accordingly. the judgment of the Court of APJ)eals is affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to that 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
.Jnprttnt <qonrt 4lf tlft ~t~ .Statts 
._asl{ing~ ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1645 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 




.Jnprtmt Qfonrl ltf tJrt ~t~ .Jtattg 
jirulp:ttg~ ~. Qf. 2llfi'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1645 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~I 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
copies to the conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
Sn.pumt ~~ cf tift ~b- ~tatts 
.. rutqtnghttt. ~. <4· 2.tlbi~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE October )Q, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1645 - Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. v. 
Harry Lewis. 
Dear Potter, 
In due course, I shall circulate a 
dissent in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice. Stewart 








You have written a fine opinion, and I expect 
join it. 
I do have, however, a question or two. At the 
bottom of page 7, in what in effect is a "holding• sentence, 
the opinion states that S215 authorizes a suit for 
"rescission or for an injunction against continued operation 
of the contract, and for restitution". I take this to mean 
that the contract with an investment adviser would be voided 
and that at least all fees paid to the adviser would be 
restored. 
But the term "restitution" could be read as meaning 
considerably more. 
Do you think the term, for example, could be r··~·?~iJ 
construed to entitle an investor to recover the full amount ~;·~;'~ :. 
of capital Placed in the hands (or at the disposal of) the 
advisor to invest? If this view were taken, an investor who 
had lost 50% of his original capital in reliance upon the . 
adviser's advice, would be entitled to recover the oriqinal ~~:~·,.;~t '' 
100%. In effect, this would be a recovery of damages. . .. ~,! ~,:"ft , 
I have the same question with respect to the use 
the term "status quo" on page 13 of the opinion. 
Normally, an investor is not deemed to have 
suffered any damages (i.e., any recoverable damages) if the 
person entrusted with investment of capital conserves the 
2. 
principal. Investment advisers, bankers and brokers (indeed, • ~ 
~ even trustees) do not guarantee preservation of capital or 
profits. If an investor had turned $100,000 over to an 
adviser a month ago, and if the adviser had invested in 
quality blue chips, there could have been a shrinkage in the 
original capital of 15 to 25' - depending on which "chips• 
were purchased. Of course, if the original capital were 
stolen, of if fraud were practiced, rescission would include, 
I suppose, recovery of the original capital. 
If, however, there were only negligence, I would 
assume that normally rescission - as an equitable remedy -
would not be available. 
Respondents argue that equitable remedies may be 
inferred under the Investment Advisors Act. These might be 
indistinguishable from ordinary damages if rescission is 
construed broadly to allow recovery for negligent as well as 
fraudulent conduct. I am not sure, as you and I have 
discussed, that even an action to recover monies lost through 
fraud may be inferred. Every complaint will aver fraud, and 
thus - as a practical matter - unless rescission is defined 
narrowly we may have opened the door widely to private suits. 
In any event, shouldn't we try to clarify this 
situation. 
One minor point relates to the first sentence 
page 9. I would appreciate your considering changing 
word •would" in the first line to "could", and adding 
the word •evidence• in the second line the qualifying 
•persuasive". I would think that settled rules of 
construction would not yield unless there were rather 
conclusive evidence of a contrary legislative intent. 
I would prefer not to cite Borak at all. An 
anomaly when decided, and in light of more recent cases 
{especially Touche, Ross, and vour opinion in this case), I 
view Borak as a *dead cock in the pit•. 
As I believe my dissenting opinion in Cannon is the 
singl~ most detailed documentation of the extent to which 
Congress has failed to be explicit as to the right to sue, ~ 
and the tendency (if not eagerness) of federal courts to 
imply causes of action, I may add a one sentence concurring 
opinion substantially as follows: 
3. 
"As I view the Court's opinion to be compatible with 
my dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicaqo, 
u.s., at (ante, at 8, 9), I ioin the Court•s---
opinion.·--- ----
Sincerely, 




.JUSTICE w ... .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.Jnpt-tmt Ofttttrl qf flrt ~b ,jhdt,g 
Jfu~ ~. OJ. 2ug;,.~ 
October 30, 1979 / 
RE: No. 77-1645 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. 
Lewis 
Dear Potter: 
I will await the dissent in the above. 
Sincerely, 
;k;' 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~uprmu OJ~ qf tlrt ~ttb' ~hdtg 
Jlzudtin:ghtn. !fl. <!f. 20~'1-' 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
October 30, 1979 
Re: 77-1645 - Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors v. Lewis ------------------------------------
Dear Potter: 
I will await the dissent in this case. 
Respectfully, 
Jl 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
